"The Development of Scottish Nationalism"

- Nemo Me Impune Lacesset -

This is a very well-received 2nd term university project in social history, on the development of Scottish nationalism. The project was finished at the 21st of May 1997 at Aalborg University, Denmark, under the (perfunctory :-) supervision of Robert Chr. Thomsen, by the following people:

© Copyright is retained by the four authors listed above, All Rights Reserved.

Comments are always encouraged! :-)

The project was converted and cross referenced to hypertext by Mads Orbesen Troest (phew!).
Current document revision is 1.08, last altered at the 19th of June 1998.

Table of Contents

    1. The Development of Nationalism
    2. Analysis of the Development of Nationalism in Scotland
      1. 1707 - 1832
      2. 1832 - 1914
      3. 1914 - 1960
      4. 1960 - Present Day
    1. "Nation"
    2. "National Identity"
    3. "Nationalism"
    4. "Pseudo-Nationalism"
    1. 1707 - 1832 (Marianne Stig Nielsen)
      1. The 18th Century
      2. The Highlander Regiments
      3. Pre-Romanticism in Scotland
      4. The Ossian Cult
      5. Walter Scott
      6. A Mess of Cultural Pottage?
    2. 1832 - 1914 (Carsten Hammer Andersen)
      1. The 1832 Reform Act
      2. The Industrial Revolution
      3. Conditions of the Working Class
      4. The Disruption of 1843
      5. The Scottish Educational System
      6. Social Conditions in Scotland
      7. General Perspective 1832-1914
    3. 1914 - 1960 (Lars Christensen)
      1. The Economy Situation in the Years 1914 - 1922
      2. The Economy Situation in the Years 1922 - 1960
      3. The Literary Renaissance
      4. Summary
    4. 1960 - Present Day (Mads Orbesen Troest)
      1. "The Sleeping Political Giant" - The Working-Class and Nationalism
      2. "Independence in Europe" - The European Union and Nationalism
      3. "New or Old Nationalism?" - Neo-Nationalism in Europe
    1. Literature
    2. Newspapers
    3. InterNet

1. Introduction and Problem Formulation

      Nationalism is becoming a concept invoking mostly negative associations. The media depict it as being all about people fighting for their rights, beliefs, religion and nationality - or to put it in one single term: their identity. When an identity is shared, and it furthermore is confined to a geographically clearly defined area, history has shown that the national consciousness (1) of that region can develop into what is associated with nationalism.

      Looking at Britain today, we witness - in the case of Northern Ireland - the armed consequences of two diverging national identities, the Irish and the British, each feeling threatened by the other. Here the clash of identities causes regular confrontations. Looking at Scotland, though, we have only recently experienced a real (but still non-violent) struggle for devolution, apart from what might best be described as a dissenting grumbling, but still conforming, reaction to the superior rule of Great Britain.

      The 1707 incorporation of Scotland into Great Britain was not something a united Scotland agreed quietly upon. There was, in particular, a strong division between the interests of the Highlands and Lowlands, the former feeling very much forced into an unwanted union. After the final, failed Jacobite rebellion of 1745 the Catholic Highlanders were forced to succumb to the superior English power. After crushing the revolt, the English were hard on the defeated Highlands, banning what had come to be the symbol of the rebels: tartan and bagpipes. Sparked by this increased weight upon the yoke of oppression, imagined and real, the feeling of a lost struggle for the nation's freedom began to emerge. The tartan clad Highlander playing his bagpipe, and images of a lost, glorious era of freedom and military grandeur, was embraced as the symbol of Scottishness and incorporated into the mythical past depicted in Tartanry. And later, during the late Romantic period, the super-romantic literary tradition known as Kailyard was born in the Lowlands, describing the Scots as a rural, cosy, easy going people. This very selective "postcard" image has expressed Scottishness ever since, being deeply rooted in both foreigners and the Scots themselves.

      But while other nations of Europe developed an established nationalism, this never appeared to happen in Scotland. One might have expected a fierce feeling of Scottishness to thrive on the dissatisfaction with what most Scots regarded as the unjust English annexation of Scotland into the United Kingdom. This dissatisfaction, one might also expect, would ultimately have brought about an open, perhaps even armed, conflict; but such never occurred after the Jacobite uprisings. How can this be; were the Scots merely seized by defeatism, or was the Union not a wholly unfavourable construct, in spite of its apparent focus on English interests? Since most Scots did seem to have some idea of their identity, even if forged by a deliberate selection of past glory, it seems peculiar that this pseudo-nationalism, as reflected in Tartanry and Kailyard, never proceeded to develop into a "true" nationalism until the last half of the 20th century. Why, if indeed, is Scotland now going through the forming of nationalism that most European nations did following the French Revolution in 1789? Which factors made the nation want to struggle for becoming an independent state, now, and do the Scots agree about where the best future of Scotland lies? It could appear that a Scottish nationalism is suddenly becoming a necessity for the Scots; that the past, established cultural sub-nationality is no longer enough to form the foundation on which to construct a future, truly autonomous nation state. Does coping with the grip of the old national myth become an obstacle to overcome, if an independent Scottish nation is to emerge finally?

       We encapsulate the above questions in the final problem formulation of this study:

      Which factors have, until the late 20th century, kept the pseudo-nationalism of Scotland, following the Union of 1707, from developing into the conventional nationalism historically experienced in other European nations?

2. Method

      The following contains a description of the overall structure and motivation of the analysis and the preceding historical overview of the development of nationalism.

      Notes and references for each chapter immediately follow their conclusion. {HTML Conversion Note: All notes and references have been moved to the end of the text, immediately following the conclusion chapter.}

2.1 The Development of Nationalism

      This chapter will try to provide the reader with an understanding of the basic underlying factors forming the concept of nationalism. Nationalism is hard to understand without the knowledge of the period in which it emerged, so a short presentation of the Romanticism will also be part of this chapter. We realise that this examination is far from thorough, since emphasis has been put on nationalism in Scotland rather than the general nature of nationalism. A very brief account of the development of nationalism in Europe will also be given.

      The motivation of this brief account is to provide the reader with a foundation on which to build the analysis of the development of Scottish nationalism, as well as the comparative remarks on the development in Scotland contra Europe.

2.2 Analysis of the Development of Nationalism in Scotland

      This chapter contains the main focus of our examination of the development of Scottish nationalism. We intend to conduct a chronological examination of the years from 1707 up until present day, divided into four historically distinct periods. In the following the methods of each separate period will be described in detail.

2.2.1 1707 - 1832

      This part of the analysis will take its beginning in 1707, when the Union of Parliaments between England and Scotland was validated. Just to sum up the recent history before the Union, the Glorious Revolution and its effects will be shortly dealt with. The eighteenth century will not be examined in great detail, as it is of little relevance to this study, considering the fact that any talk of nationalism would be anachronistic before the nineteenth century. However, some features of Scottish life in the eighteenth century are of importance for the following years - and thus for the development of Scottish pseudo-nationalism - in order to understand the concept of Tartanry, one has to know of the Jacobite Risings and the Highlander Regiments, for example. The last 25 years of the eighteenth century will also be discussed, since they have great influence on the forming of the Romanticism. The same reasons applies to the section covering the Ossian cult.

      The first 32 years of the nineteenth century are of great significance for the development of Scottish pseudo-nationalism. It is the period when a "real" nationalism is taking its form throughout Europe, as opposed to Scotland. Emphasis will be put on the role of Walter Scott, since he is - to a wide extent - considered the inventor of Scottish pseudo-nationalism. The relationship between England and Scotland will be mentioned, along with the dual identity of the Scots. The state visit of King George IV will be treated as a kind of outbreak of Tartanry, which plays a significant role in the diffusion of Scottish pseudo-nationalism. Lastly, the expression "to sell out one's political birthright for a mess of cultural pottage" will be assessed, as Scotland is often being said to have done just that.

2.2.2 1832 - 1914

      During this period of Scottish history, Scotland undergoes a lot of domestic changes. To outline some of these changes: the urbanisation, the Disruption of 1843, the Great Highland Famine of 1845, various reform acts and, finally, the industrial revolution spanning over a period of 134 years (1780-1914). (2) This shows a century in which the Scots are going through major problems; both the single worker, as well as the bigger political issues.

      The analysis concerning this period will mainly put focus on the educational system before and after the Disruption. The aim of this investigation is to discuss whether a common educational system, as opposed to an unstructured one, has any influence on the development of nationalism. Furthermore, we intend to dig into the outcome and consequences of the industrialisation of Scotland, focused on the disruption in 1843, as this marked the beginning of a separation of class in Scotland. Held up against our primary focus, the development of Scottish nationalism, it could prove to be of great importance, as a split-up between the bourgeoisie and the poor, unemployed members of the working force created a larger and larger rift between the classes.

      A general perspective on the Reform Act of 1832 will also be a part of the analysis, as this provides an understanding of why Scotland had no use of an aggressive nationalism. The Scots who were able to make nationalism a political issue, were the bourgeoisie; but they were satisfied with the way things went, and saw no reason to change it. (3)

      The reason for choosing these particular subjects, is to find out why Scottish nationalism has apparently dwelt during this period, even though one might have suspected it to rise, as a result of unemployment, the Highland famine, deteriorating housing conditions in the fast growing cities, and various other social problems.

      A part of the analysis will also touch briefly upon the above mentioned changes, in order to show how social conditions were in Scotland during the nineteenth century.

2.2.3 1914 - 1960

      Speaking of the period 1914-1960 in connection with almost any European nation, one will inevitably come to think of no less than two world wars, within a span of merely 46 years. Scotland being a part of Great Britain is, of course, no exception.

      As "the first world war is so often seen as a watershed in the development of Scottish society and its economy" (4) this part of the project will therefore deal with the impact this war had on the nation; especially concerning Scotland's economy, as it may be presumed that the condition of the nation's economy will act as a major player, when the question of nationalism (or lack of it) is being raised. The idea is to investigate, whether the fluctuation of the economy has in turn enhanced or inhibited the urge for nationalism.

      Secondly, space will be lent to a short examination of the influence the literary renaissance in the 1920s had on the development of nationalism.

2.2.4 1960 - Present Day

      This chapter puts focus on the development of Scottish nationalism from around the 1960s up until present day. Observing modern Scotland, an upsurge of nationalistic tendencies seems to take place; this chapter comments on the nature of this recent development, and attempts to locate and explain prominent factors.

      Possible connections to the social situation of the common Scotsman, in terms of employment and standard of living, will be discussed, as will relations to the state and influence of Scottish industry during the period. These factors are likely to bias the public attitude towards the Union, since it could be conceived as either a useful scapegoat for pressing problems in the society, or, alternatively, as a security net in times of trouble.

      Some emphasis will also be put on the development of the European Union (EU) and the recent goal of Scotland's nationalists: "Independence within Europe". It is possible that this new prospect has kindled a new, broader wave of nationalism, because of its "back door" to an independence of sorts. At the same time, the advocation of the EU might present some ideological problems, it being another centralised union, perhaps not much unlike that of the UK. This will be investigated.

      Finally, it has been observed that a wave of neo-nationalism is experienced in other European nations. Comments on the nature of this new nationalism will be made, and its possible relations to the development in Scotland will be tested.

3. Criticism of Sources

      Throughout this study, much background material on the history of Scotland has been utilised; not all of it can be mentioned here.

      An invaluable resource has been "Scotland - A New History" by Michael Lynch. This book aims to cover most of Scotland's history in one volume; hence, one must bear in mind the possible lack of thorough examination, due to lack of space. As the author puts it in his preface: "The potential contents of a book which tries to cover the history of a nation are vast". (5) However, where details have been scarce, it has enabled us to seek further information in more specific works.

      Examples of such other historical works are "State and Society - British Political & Social History 1870-1992" by Martin Pugh and "People and Society in Scotland", edited by W. Hamish Fraser and R. J. Morris. These focus on distinctive aspects or periods of Scottish history, providing abundances of details, which - combined with the general overview provided by Lynch - have proven an efficient combination.

      Much specific literature has been applied to the four historical segments of our analysis; it has not been deemed necessary to comment further on these thorough volumes. Please refer to the bibliography (chapter 8) for an extensive list.

      Various SNP material has been used, and when dealing with data from such political organs or pressure groups, one must be aware of the possibly one-tracked presentation of the debated issues. There is a tendency to present claims as facts, and figures without further references (one example being the declaration of Scotland possessing as much as 70% of the EU's fuel reserves).

      Certain sources from the InterNet have been employed, and where the information derived from these is, of course, believed be correct and from serious, static (to the extent possible on such a construct) sources, the very dynamic nature of this global computer network poses a special requirement for caution. Just about anybody with access to the net, can publish their own "facts" (during the information acquisition phase, several examples of unsupported claims from 'suspicious sources' were experienced, such as persons claiming the 1707 Union between Scotland and Britain was never valid). Another problem is the transient nature of the net; a source being available today might, in theory, be gone the next - especially when one is not using official or semi-official sites. Thus, care has been taken in selecting only sources believed to be serious and stable. (Furthermore, as a precaution, hardcopies of the material exists, in case of any resources expiring or being altered on the network).

4. Definitions

      The following definitions of the terms "nation", "national identity" and "nationalism" should not in any way be considered an attempt of a thorough discussion of these. This would lie beyond the scope of this examination of the development of Scottish nationalism, and would readily provide the foundation of a separate, extensive study. Thus, the interpretations presented here are derived from works by E. J. Hobsbawm (6), Anthony D. Smith (7), John Breuilley (8) and Tom Nairn (9), and applied throughout this study without further comment.

4.1 "Nation"

      Nations, as defined by A. D. Smith, is: "A named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members." (10) This is a very tangible definition compared to other scientists in this field.

      By referring to E. J. Hobsbawm, it would be plausible to explain that the nation is generated from a large body of people sharing some mutual interests. "Any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a 'nation' will be treated as such". (11)

      By utilising E. Gellner, Hobsbawm stresses the element of artefact and invention, and at the same time a very interesting approach, which is called social engineering. No further definition of what is meant by social engineering is given, but by referring to A. D. Smith, we see it as a way of making people share a common consciousness. Smith argues that through education it is possible to enhance the development of a common language, and constitute myths and history; leading to a homogenous culture. This should provide the population with the sensation of belonging to a nation.

      Thus, we define a nation as a geographically demarcated area, whose people share a common background through language, culture, myths and history. Furthermore, a political power-centre must be present; people must have a sense of belonging to that particular area.

4.2 "National Identity"

      Consulting both Smith and Hobsbawm, it has proven quite difficult to find a direct guidance to how national identity is best defined, but national identity seems to spring from the same factors which define the nation. This apparent congruence has led to the assumption that the introduction of the factors present when defining a nation, are also the factors constituting national identity.

      National identity will then be defined as a set of symbols and mutually accepted - but implicit - values, ideologies and morality shared by the bulk of the nation's population. National identity is not something one chooses for oneself; rather, it is something created by society.

4.3 "Nationalism"

      There are different perceptions of how to define nationalism. According to A. B. Phillip, political nationalism:

      "[...] is the active solidarity of a group who share a common culture or history and a sense of nationhood and who seek to give this common experience a political reality whether by means of self-government or some other kind of political recognition, if not autonomy". (12)

      This definition of nationalism is largely shared by A. D. Smith, thus a quote of Smith's definition will be regarded as unnecessary.

      In comparison, J. Breuilly has a more radical way of defining nationalism, as he states that nationalism is "a vehicle of acquisition of state power which takes advantage of the space created by the emergence of 'civil society'." (13)

      Hence, we define nationalism - in this context - as an extroverted and potentially aggressive protective mechanism, a means by which to preserve national interests and sovereignty. Nationalism feeds on the established images of national identity.

4.4 "Pseudo-Nationalism"

      In order to distinguish "real" nationalism, as defined in 4.3, from the politically impotent form of nationalism experienced in Scotland, we have constructed the term pseudo-nationalism. This variation of nationalism also stems from established images of national identity, but maintains these at the same time. It is introspective and non-aggressive.

      In this context it will converge with what Tom Nairn has called cultural sub-nationalism, meaning the docile images reflected in Tartanry and Kailyard.

5. The Development of Nationalism

      It has been said that the modern man/woman was born in the age of Romanticism, i.e. that the individual, with his/her thoughts, feelings and opinions, for the first time was more important than the community. You might as well say that the modern society was born at the same time, i.e. that a whole new world was created in Romanticism, an entire revolution is emerging behind the faded picture postcard, left for us to see. Romanticism was a strong movement, almost a cultural revolution, but just as much an economic and a political revolution. In the age of Romanticism capitalism, industrialisation, democracy, bourgeoisie and last but not least nationalism were born. The German philosopher, J. G. Herder invented the terms "Rechtstaat" and "Kulturstaat". We might call the former "the state" and the latter "the nation", which Herder defines as "a sense of collective identity based on a common cultural tradition". He introduced another term: "Volksgeist", defined as "consisting of language, literature and a shared heritage of folk and popular tradition". (14) This Kulturstaat and this talk of "Volksgeist" conform nicely to the spirit of the time and they were a part of a natural development. The concept of kings as being installed by God had been disputed, the American and the French peoples had thrown off the yoke and created (more or less successfully) their own nation-state(s), the infrastructure had improved, literacy was spreading out through Europe - the conditions for forming nations were present. And the advantages of such a community are obvious : a strong unity, which would be prepared to defend the borders of the nation. Uffe Østergård also thinks it was about democracy:

      "Demokrati forudsætter en eller anden grad af lighed eller rettere ensliggørelse. Placeringen af suveræniteten hos 'folket' forudsætter identitet ved dette folk, hvad enten det defineres sprogligt, etnisk eller politisk." (15)

      Tom Nairn also sees a connection:

      "Modernization and all its concomitants (industrialization, political democracy, general literacy, etc., etc.) notoriously tend towards uniformity and the standardization of many aspects of existence." He continues: "This is of course why nationalism has been a central, inescapable feature of the development of "modern society". (16)

      Another - rather infamous - source, Joseph Stalin, is - not surprisingly - convinced that it was all about capitalism:

      "Nationen er ikke simpelthen en historisk Kategori, men en historisk Kategori fra en bestemt Epoke, den opadstigende Kapitalismes Epoke. Den Proces, der likviderer Feudalismen og udvikler Kapitalismen, slutter samtidig Menneskene sammen til Nationer."

      Later on he writes:

      "Bourgeoisiet spillede Hovedrollen. Det vigtigste Spørgsmål for det unge Bourgeoisi er Markedet. Dets Maal er at afsætte sine Varer og at sejre i Konkurrencen med andre Nationaliteters Bourgeoisi. Derfra stammer dets Ønske om at sikre sig sit 'eget', 'hjemlige' Marked. Markedet er den første Skole, hvor Bourgeoisiet lærer Nationalisme." (17)

      Now, you may think of the source what you like, and we are aware of the fact that it is a very Marxist explanation, but we think there is a lot of truth in it . It is probably not a coincidence that Stalin uses the metaphor "school", since the schools - now available for all - were brilliant tools to form the national identity with, as we will look closer at in the period 1832-1914.

      Democracy, capitalism, market (and the protection of it), industrialisation - issues you see either invented or revived in this span of time - were all inextricably linked with nationalism, and they were all part of a development. The idea of nationalism was conceived by the intelligentsia (intelligentsia is, according to Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, people within a community who are of high intelligence and are interested in culture, learning, the arts, etc.) You may add that the role of the intelligentsia is rapidly changing in this period. Tom Nairn writes that they are "no longer the servants of a closed aristocratic élite, they became vital elements in the cohesion of society as a whole." (18) and they influenced the up-coming force, the bourgeoisie, a group of determined and self-assured people, who wanted to be heard and asked. The political landscape was forever changed. The lower classes were influenced by the bourgeoisie - the goal was obtainable - nationalism was possible. And nationalism was the perfect means to secure the borders of a strong, potentially aggressive nation-state.

      Miroslav Hroch assigns nationalism to three categories: phase A, spanning from 1789 to approximately 1815, when nationalism was only shared by a relatively small intelligentsia, inspired by the French Revolution. Phase B (1815-1848), when the idea of nationalism was diffused among the up-coming bourgeoisie, and phase C from 1848, when nationalism had a wide popular appeal. (19) From the end of World War I there was a major nationalist settlement, leading to the fall of the Habsburg Empire, among other things. (20)

      Ernest Gellner says that nationalism in general is "a phenomenon connected not so much with industrialisation or modernisation as such, but with its uneven diffusion." (21) He calls it a "tidal wave of modernisation". The modernisation took place in England and France, the two leading super-powers of this period: in England as a industrial revolution, in France as a political revolution, and this dual revolution influenced all of Europe. First, this tidal wave hit Germany and Italy, where the concept of nationalist politics and culture was mainly formed. Shortly after, it reached Central and Eastern Europe, and later still Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Scandinavia. (22)

      Tom Nairn divides the European countries into three categories. Firstly, the "historic" nation-states, England, France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Holland - countries, which was either past or present super-powers. Secondly, the German-speaking states, Italy, the Habsburg Empire, the Balkans, Ireland and Scandinavia apart from Sweden, countries, which tried to follow the "leaders" closely - these countries were by for the greater part of Europe, geographically, as well as in terms of population. Thirdly, he mentions Scotland, in a category all by it self. What has Scotland done to earn this solitary position? Because its situation is unique - through the precocious industrial development, almost handed over to the Scots by the Union. This was a stage, which offered an important role to the intelligentsia in other, European countries. Here, they influenced the bourgeoisie in order to change things - in order to modernise society. In Scotland, the intelligentsia was deprived of this role. One could easily imagine the need for a safe and harmless identity in a rapidly changing world, and these two things combined are important for the invention of the Scottish, cultural sub-nationalism.

6. Analysis of the Development of Nationalism in Scotland

6.1 1707 - 1832

6.1.1 The 18th Century

      One might argue that the period from 1707 to approximately 1800 would appear somewhat irrelevant for this study, since any use of the term "nationalism" in this span of time would be anachronistic. But in order to understand the following years, one has to know of the preceding century.

      The Glorious Revolution - which was not all that glorious and peaceful as Anglo-centric historians have phrased it - occurred in 1688. For once, Whigs and Tories agreed upon something: both groups would dethrone King James II, who was a Catholic as opposed to the majority of the English population, and the King of Ireland and Scotland as well. They offered the throne of England to William of Orange, who was a Protestant, and when he landed in England with his army, James II fled to France. In 1689 William (1689-1702) ascended the throne, and the Scottish government accepted his sovereignty. (23)

      This acceptance was not made by a unified Scotland - Scotland was divided in a Protestant and a Catholic population.

      Roughly put, the Protestants were the Lowlanders and the Catholics the Highlanders. The Highlanders, of course, wanted their Catholic King, James II, back. Jacobus was the Latinname for James, and therefore his supporters called themselves Jacobites. (24)

      During the following years, William proposed a complete Union to the Parliament of Scotland twice - in 1700 and 1702. But it was not until a severe economic crisis, on account of harvest failure and the economic adventure in Panama, where the Scots tried to establish a colony (an attempt which failed utterly due to fever, hostile natives and lacking English co-operation) that the Scottish Parliament did agree to a Union of Parliaments. (25)

      This was not a particularly popular decision among the Scottish population - there was an overwhelming feeling of anti-English bitterness. Queen Anne (1702-1714) had many spies in Scotland, and one of them reported:

      "In Edinburgh and to northwards especially, they cry so bitterly against the Union, cursing those great men of theirs that gave consent to it, that one may see fifty men before one that is for the Union, in South or North." (26)

      Why did the Union come off, then? Probably because the ruling classes of both countries saw an advantage in it. Uffe Østergård quotes Pocock, who puts it this way: "The 'Britain' of 1707 created no new nationality; it was the fruit of an English desire for stability and a Scottish pursuit of economic modernisation." (27)

      In other words: England wanted to bring Scotland under control so they could be able to prevent European adversaries from using Scotland as a base of attack, among other things. For Scotland, the advantage was access to the trade with the English colonies. The Union meant that Scotland turned the right of succession over to the Hanoverian royal house. The Scottish Parliament was dissolved and Scottish representatives were sent to Westminster instead. The two countries were to have common economic politics and common tariff barriers. Scotland were to maintain her own Kirk, legislation and education system. (28)

      Two aspects of the Union are worthwhile noticing: that the Scots were allowed to keep their own Kirk, law and education - "the English ruling class was able to tolerate a high degree of North-British autonomy" (29) - and that Scotland were handed the industrial revolution on a silver plate.

      The Scottish society was backwards at the entry of the eighteenth century - at the entry of the nineteenth century, Scotland was a comparatively wealthy and industrialised nation. At this point, however, the Scots showed no enthusiasm about the Union, which, admittedly, did not turn out as profitable as expected - the first forty years did not result in any economic improvement worth mentioning.

      There were two major Jacobite Risings - one in 1715 and one in 1745. Originally Jacobites were the people who supported James II, but later on Jacobites became identified with rebels fighting against the Union. The first Rising took place after Queen Anne's death in 1714. George I of Hanover succeeded to the throne, but in Scotland James III, son of James II, was proclaimed king in September 1715. James III was in France, but he sailed off for Scotland. He arrived at the end of the year, delayed by illness, bad weather and poor communications. James III turned out to be a rather incompetent leader, and besides he was not supported by the French King, as he had expected, since Louis XIV had just died, and Louis XV was not inclined to help him. (30) The Jacobite Rising was lead by the eleventh Earl of Mar, a former Unionist and Tory, but since George I had deprived him of his privileges, he had changed side and was now in charge of the Jacobite army, which numbered about 10.000 (Brander and Bingham do not agree upon the figures).

      The Government forces numbered about 3000. The two armies fought a battle at Sheriffmuir, which both sides claimed as a victory. The Government forces suffered the heavier casualties, but they ended up possessing the field, while the Earl of Mar withdrew. James III and the Earl of Mar left Scotland in February 1716, leaving the Jacobites on their own. (31)

      On 23 July 1745 Prince Charles Edward Stewart, the son of James III, landed at Eriskay. Unlike his father, he was a very charismatic leader - Lord Balmerino called him "so sweet a Prince that flesh and blood could not resist following him". (32) Prince Charles was not received with enthusiasm, but he soon found support - in September he was in control of almost all of Scotland, and he advanced as far as to Derby, 127 miles from London; but the support he had hoped to find on his way failed, and he retreated northwards the 17th of January 1746. He won the battle at Falkirk, but on the 16th of April he lost an uneven and impossible fight - the famous battle at Culloden.

      After the battle, Prince Charles was hiding for five months before he could escape in exile, protected by the Highlanders in spite of a 30.000 reward on his head, and an intense man-hunt. Hereafter you might say he was almost canonised - anyway, he was transformed into a romantic hero, who has achieved an everlasting fame. (33)

      This lost rebellion was strictly a Highland Affair, and to crush the Highland culture, the Dress Act of 1746 was introduced. The act prohibited any use of Highland Dress, and if you committed that crime, punishment was hard: six month's imprisonment - for a second offence possibly transportation "to any of His Majesty's Plantations beyond the Seas, there to remain for the space of Seven Years".

      Dr. Johnson, one of the most outstanding members of English intellectual life, travelled in the Highlands in 1773, and there he found that the Dress Act had been "universally obeyed". (34)

      The Dress Act was not repealed until 1782.

6.1.2 The Highlander Regiments

      The use of Highland Dress was only legitimate in the Highland Regiments, which were raised and incorporated in the British Army in large numbers during the eighteenth century. (35) The Highland culture was male and martial - many clansmen had no other profession than one of arms, and to them the Highland Regiments were a possibility to continue their way of life; here they could still be warriors, and still wear the kilt. Tom Nairn even states that "one welcome aspect of the Union of 1707 was the way it consolidated the new prospects for Scots soldiers". (36)

      The British Government was content, too - it had found a brilliant way to pacify the Highlanders and make use of them in the war machinery they had to maintain to be able to control their colonies - and conquer new ones. (37)

      In fact, the Highland Regiments were very significant - "They helped reconcile Highlands and Lowlands in an important sense." (38) and "The Gaels, from being viewed a barbarous nuisances, became regarded as in some ways the very embodiment of Scotland. The kilt and the bagpipes acquired popularity where hitherto they had enjoyed none. The new cult was mawkish and often at variance with the facts of Scottish life." (39)

      In a sense, the Highland Regiments unified the two very different cultures of Scotland, and the Regiment changed the image of Highlanders as being backward and savage. "The metamorphosis of the Highlander from Wild Scot to national hero was complete". (40)

      This "Infant Tartanry" was a very adequate remedy to use in the orchestration of the Scottish pseudo-nationalism, which was important in the preventing of "real" nationalism, as we will see later.

6.1.3 Pre-Romanticism in Scotland

      The Romanticism is often seen as a reaction against the Enlightenment - the emotional, the dreaming, the mystical, the idealistic against the rationality, the science and the faith in progress. But it gives more sense to look at it as anatural development, since the last 25 years of the eighteenth century clearly points towards Romanticism: the freedom-loving, the revolutionary, sprung from the American and the French revolutions, the idea of "the noble savage", the worshipping of nature and "the simple life of the shepherd", the overwhelming interest in history, folk music, folktales and popular traditions, etc. For the Scots, this pre-Romantic period were to be known as the Golden Age. Hume, Burns, Smith, Boswell were just names in a row of prominent, Scottish personalities, influencing the European culture. You might wonder why there is such a significant florescence at this particular moment of Scottish history, and ask with David Hume:

      "Is it not strange that, at a time when we have lost our Princes, our Parliaments, our independent Government, even the Presence of our chief Nobility, are unhappy, in our Accent & Pronunciation, speak a very corrupt Dialect of the Tongue which we make use of; is it not strange, I say, that, in these Circumstances, we shou'd [sic] really be the People most distinguished for Literature in Europe?". (41)

      If you add the geographic position of Scotland - remote and isolated - you can only wonder even more. Tom Nairn thinks that: "They simply belonged to a unique, pre-nationalist stage of socio-economic expansion". (42) A similar paradox can be found in Denmark - at a time, when our unhappy infatuation with Napoleon almost cost us our existence as a nation-state, we see the cultural florescence we call the Golden Age.

6.1.4 The Ossian Cult

      James MacPherson should have the honour of playing an excellent role, both in Scotland and in the dawning, European Romanticism. In 1760-63 he published three prose works, which he claimed were the works of Ossian, a Gaelic bard from the third century AD. The works were tales of love and heroes, much like the tales of Virgil and Homer. They created sensation in Scotland, in England and in all of Europe. They inspired artists everywhere and encouraged people in Germany and Scandinavia to seek their Nordic past; Nordic, but just as proud and heroic as the Latin/Greek past. Ossian enthralled Napoleon, who even brought the book with him on campaigns and on St. Helena. (43) The cult of Ossian lasted 60 years on the continent, but in England and Scotland the excitement faded, when prominent persons doubted its authenticity. MacPherson had no clear proof to show, but persisted that he had reproduced an old, Gaelic text, written down after centuries of oral tradition. Dr. Johnson went to the Western Isles, where he discovered that the population were almost completely illiterate, but that they in fact had a strong oral tradition. Thus, he concluded that MacPherson had created Ossian from old songs, blending its with his own imagination. (44) Authentic or not, one cannot disregard the great impact Ossian had on the forming of the Romanticism.

6.1.5 Walter Scott

      Walter Scott wrote historical novels, i.e. novels originating in historical events, which would serve as a colourful background for the pure fiction of his imaginative stories. Usually, we think of Scott as a Romantic novelist, but Tom Nairn calls him a "Valedictory Realist", by which he means that Scott never resuscitated the glorious past because he had a wish to change the present. On the contrary, he emphasised that the past was dead and had better be left that way, however glorious it may have been. Your heart might belong to Jacobitism, but your head had to acknowledge the benefits of the Union. The heart and the hand should not work together.

      In this sense he differs from European Romantic authors in general. (45) There was no revolutionary soul hidden in Scott's personality; he was a Unionist, a Tory, a realist who was satisfied with the current state of things, and only wanted to consolidate Scotland's position as a member of The United Kingdom.

      He was a Jacobite and a Unionist, and apparently he did not see any contradictions in this constellation. He loved the Scottish - and the English - history; he found grandeur and pride in both. This may seem strange, almost dishonest, to us (well-educated in the Danish, national school as we are), but perhaps this was natural for a man living in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Union was more than a hundred years old; Scotland had prospered, taken a gigantic step forward, culturally, economically and socially, there had been a great, mutual influence between the Scottish and the English peoples. Maybe - if we try to forget our own ideas, our own values and the two hundred years that separate us from Scott - it is not that strange altogether.

      Tom Nairn mentions a similar case, concerning Robert Burns. We see him as an ardent Jacobite, and notes us that he "knelt at the tomb of Sir John the Graham, the gallant friend of the immortal Wallace" and "said a fervent prayer for old Caledonia over the hole in a blue whinstone, where Robert de Bruce fixed his royal standard on the banks of Bannockburn" - but Tom Nairn does not see this as nationalism or any hostility towards England - rather, he sees it as a sign of the spirit of the time, influenced by the enthusiasm for revolution and freedom, and feels that for Burns in 1793 Bannockburn was directly associated with the French revolution. (46)

      Always, you sense this strange relationship between England and Scotland. Of course you can talk of a relationship between a small and a greater, far more powerful, nation; but there is more to it. A cultural exchange, a mutual respect. The Scots have apparently accepted and respected England, and its at that time superior power and development, and the intelligentsia sought towards London - this cultural and spirited bee's nest - for longer or shorter stays - and the English have admired the Scottish "noble" culture, and they have spent their holidays in this wild and beautiful country.

      Prince George wore Highland dress at a masquerade ball in 1789 and "received the appellation of the Royal Highland Laddie", (47) which shows it must have been considered quite fashionable, honourable and exotic to dress as a Highlander (also showing how the intelligentsia embraced the Highland culture).

      Queen Victoria wrote the following in her Journal on 12 September 1873:

      "I feel a sort of reverence in going over the scenes [of Prince Charles Edward's fugitive wanderings] in this most beautiful country, which I am proud to call my own, where there was such devoted loyalty to the family of my ancestors - for Stuart blood is in my veins, and I am now their representative." (48)

      This is of course written in a later period than the one dealt with here - and you have to bear Queen Victoria's personal infatuation with the Highland in mind, but it shows a respect for Scotland that you might not have expected to find.

      In 1822 Scott was asked to stage King George IV's state visit in Scotland. Scott made it a pageant, which should be a reconciliation between Scotland and England, more than anything else. In 1745 Highlanders had invaded Edinburgh and in 1822 Highlanders were to parade in Edinburgh in honour of George IV. Highland dress was worn - not as a sign of resistance, now, but as a part of a splendid show, which should consolidate the Union and the Hanoverian royal power.

      George IV repaid by wearing Highland dress at the Levee (even though some thought that the King was too corpulent to wear the kilt!). (49)

      The state visit was a great success, and Edinburgh was swarming with people, dressed in kilts, produced for the very occasion. (50)

      Walter Scott "made us appear a nation of Highlanders" as one of the few critical voices said, (51) but obviously this Tartan-event fulfilled a need of a distinct national identity - an identity more satisfying than "North Britishness". This leads us to two interesting aspects: the dual identity of the Scots and the fact that the Scottish, national identity from now on was strongly influenced by Highland culture. Michael Lynch claims that by 1750 most of the Scots were prepared to think of themselves as both Scots and Britons. (52) To understand this, you might think of Scotland as North Britain rather than Scotland - the difference between the Lowland culture (undeniably the culture of approximately 90% of all Scots) and the culture of the northern part of England is minimal. The real cultural difference is between the Lowland and the Highland, which is hardly surprising, considering the very different conditions of living. In spite of this difference, the Lowland gentry and bourgeoisie grabbed the chance of "reviving" a culture they had never had. The cult of Ossian had started a "Celtic Revival", but the real ignition was the novel, Waverly, written by Walter Scott and published in 1814. (53) This cultural explosion peaked at the royal state-visit in 1822.

      Caroline Bingham puts it this way: "Scott's orchestration of neo-Jacobitism in honour of George IV had the surprising effect of translating what might have been an ephemeral fashion for tartan into a lasting national symbol." (54)

      It is worthwhile noticing the frequent use of words relating to the theatrical world, when authors write about Walter Scott. (55) This is probably no coincidence - the importance of Scott as a creator of Scottish pseudo-nationalism is undeniable. You almost get an idea of Scott as being a stage-director in a play. It is difficult to believe that just one man should have this amount of influence, but it seems to be the case. You also have to consider that general literacy and higher standards of living enabled the up-coming force, the bourgeoisie, to read in an extent, which had never been known before. Walter Scott - supported by the rest of the Scottish intelligentsia - invented what we know as "Tartanry", i.e. "the myth, which contains the idea of a glorious, romantic past in the wild Scottish Highland". (56) Scott is seen as a kind of midwife, helping this "cultural sub-nationalism", as Tom Nairn calls it, on its way. (57) The cultural sub-nationalism (or pseudo-nationalism) makes Scotland unique in Europe. It is a nationalism that is cultural because it cannot be political. The gentry and the bourgeoisie were content with the current situation, which provided them with economic benefits, and they were not the least bit interested in a devolution, which would cut them off the huge market that England with its colonies represented. A "real" nationalism would be dangerous, threatening - a cultural sub-nationalism was harmless, and yet it satisfied the need for a national identity. This is one of the reasons why Scotland never developed a "real nationalism", even though you might think it had a lot of attributes normally present in the forming of a nationalism: a people with a common language and a common ethnic background, a common - and rather recent - past, and a distinct intelligentsia.

6.1.6 A Mess of Cultural Pottage?

      Has Scotland "sold out its political birthright for a mess of cultural pottage" which McCrone claims is the idée fixe of many Scottish intellectuals? (58)

      It does appear to be the case. The invention of Tartanry as a concept of the national, Scottish identity leaves you with a strange feeling. Now, it might offend somebody to see the expression: "the invention of Tartanry", because the culture, from which Tartanry is derived, of course had been valid at some time for some people; but it seems false and pompous, because it is a very romanticised, masculine and martial minority culture, eagerly grabbed by a majority, which have never really been part of this culture.

      This Tartanry is vulnerable and easy to ridicule, and it probably will lose its impact on Scottish culture gradually (if the Scots really want it to be so), but it will be a hard struggle.

      However, this implicit denial of the "political" birthright - how important is it? It might have had an unfortunate effect on the forming of a Scottish national identity, but you might doubt whether the Scots have really had a need for claiming this political birthright. Maybe a kind of Home Rule would be the answer, rather, as will be argued later.

6.2 1832 - 1914

6.2.1 The 1832 Reform Act

      The Reform Act of 1832 marked a milestone in Scottish history by an expansion of the electorate, thereby giving more Scots the opportunity to make their opinion matter.

      The conditions of the tenants are described sufficiently by Lynch: "Without the security of a secret ballot, tenants, it was complained in 1835, were driven to the polls by landowners like 'a heard of vassals'". (59)

      This is to be understood such that even though more people were allowed to vote, many tenants were forced to do so by the owners of the land which they cultivated, (60) so despite it being a free choice whether one would vote or not, the subdued farmers were facing use of excessive force from the landowners to whom they belonged.

      It was only by looking back that this involuntary way of voting was seen as wrong, when it mattered no one took further notice, and the results of the elections held were valid. This way of suppressing and thinking of the "little man", i.e. the labourers of Scotland, as worth nothing, not taken into consideration when creating a new reform act, was not a wholly unknown procedure.

      Lynch comments on this: "The consequences of the First Reform Act were born of miscalculation and muddle as much as a calculated extension of the franchise to the 'respectable' classes." (61) This means that already at an early stage in Scottish political history, there is a division between classes, a division which would prove to grow larger in time (further commented in the section covering the Disruption; chapter 6.2.4). The outcome of such treatment of the working class, one would suspect to be an uprising, or - the worst case scenario - a rebellion, seeking to make things better and more fair for "the man on the floor".

      A rebellion never occurred; in fact the Reform Act of 1832 was a lot like the first, when it came to the question of who was in power.

      "When the concessions were made, in the 'Great' [sic] Reform Act of 1832, they were, in the view of those who made them, the minimal required to assuage the most powerful groups amongst the unenfranchised and to ensure that power remained in the same hands as before". (62)

      Thus Lynch describes the making of the second reform act. Working with these two comments on the Reform Acts, makes Scotland seem a nation which was split within her own ranks. The people who were better off kept "stacking their own cash" on behalf of the working class - this is not to be seen literally, but as a description of the bourgeoisie as well-established and without care for people beneath their dignity. A passage in Fraser and Morris deals with this statement; it contains two different impressions of voluntary benefits to the poor. One by Rev. Thomas Chalmers and one by Medical Professor William Pulteney Alison - University of Edinburgh:

      "Each applicant for relief was treated on his merits, closely scrutinised by responsible neighbours, and, after all possibilities of family support were exhausted, aided from voluntary funds. Chalmers believed that the best system of relief was voluntary mutual aid within the local community: family responsibility and personal independence must be pillars of a Christian society, founded on religious education. Chalmers's [sic] view elevated some of the practical aspects of the old Scottish Poor Law into an ideal vision, but Alison argued that in reality it relieved the rich of responsibility: 'If it were not for the poor, what would become of the poor?'". (63)

      These are seriously diverging perceptions of the Poor Law, but the relevance here is to underline the differences in the Scottish society, seen in the light of nationalism. It is not likely that the Scottish people would unite in great national matters, when there was no solidarity among the different social layers. This, and the fact that the Union with Britain was not an entirely bad deal for Scotland (as discussed in chapter 6.1.1), apparently made no national tendencies emerge in Scotland at the time.

      But the voting system was not the only change forged by the Reform Act; the fact that Scotland was a British state was now generally accepted, and hereby a sense of belonging to Great Britain emerged and created the notion of Britishness - the Scots were indeed a part of the British Empire. (64) This notion, though, was shared only by the bourgeoisie; they where fairly satisfied with Scotland being an integrated part of Britain. Lynch puts it this way:

      "Bourgeois respectability linked arms with the new British state, which had emerged after the Reform Act of 1832. [...] The concentric loyalties of Victorian Scotland - a new Scottishness, a new Britishness and a revised sense of local pride - were held together by a phenomenon bigger than all of them - a Greater Britain whose stability rested on the Empire." (65)

6.2.2 The Industrial Revolution

      In 1837, as the industrial revolution was well on its way in the cotton industry, a trade union called the "Spinners Association", which up until then had prevented the introduction of new labour-saving machinery, had had enough power to influence the factory owners' decisions. After a strike in 1837, the union's power deteriorated, and industrial progress could be introduced throughout the country's cotton industry. (66)

      Once the machines were running, a factory owner could depend on very few skilled workers to keep these machines going, and the rest of the work could be performed by unskilled labour. What the various trade unions sought to prevent by keeping the human workforce in the factories, was the inevitable outcome of the industrialisation; namely huge unemployment among the skilled workforce, because of the higher wages they had to be paid, as opposed to the unskilled labour.

      Unskilled labour could be paid less wages and thereby keep the expenses down, not unlike the production philosophies we know today, when companies move their production from their homeland to a foreign country where labour is cheap, and unions do not exist or lack power to get their demands through.

      Without the unions to exercise the power held by them, the industry had no problems introducing technology and cheaper labour - this meant more profit and a faster production to the owners of the cotton mills, but the consequences for the main parts of the workforce was unemployment and a life at no more than subsistence level. This was a life without any kind of sufficient social support, as we shall see later, when dealing with the disruption of 1843 (chapter 6.2.4).

      The industrialisation resulted, at first, in employment for just about anybody; even immigrants in large numbers could be provided with a job, and thus be able to make a living and be a part of the productive society. The fact that the "rush" of the cotton mills passed, and technology/machinery replaced loads of working people, combined with the large urbanisation, resulted in an inevitable outcome: massive unemployment with depression and frustration in its wake, characterised the poor districts of the urbanised areas. Indeed, Scotland consisted primarily of labourers.

      The general perspective concerning the industrial revolution in Scotland, as described by Lynch, (67) paints a picture of a society witnessing progress and decline in its industries, not unlike any other society, but in Scotland the differences between the individual areas were so huge that when one area experiences a peak in its particular industry - cotton mills, iron moulding, coal digging, shipbuilding, etc. - another area could be at the rim of subsistence level.

6.2.3 Conditions of the Working-Class

      Now, one might suspect a movement to evolve from at least some of the slum districts throughout Scotland, as a result of the poverty, disease and starvation; a movement that would make society aware of its existence in order to force the government to do something about the accelerating social problems. But such never occurred.

      Apparently the Scottish Government became aware of the enormous problems in both the overpopulated, as well as in the rural, areas of Scotland. The conditions in the rural areas - mostly the Highlands - worsened in the nineteenth century. Around the 1840s the potato famine made life miserable for the highland crofters, they lived from whatever little harvest they could make from the exhausted soil, (68) thereby forcing several highlanders to move (flight might be the fitting term for the action) to the cities, where conditions far from improved.

      According to Fraser and Morris, the government itself took initiative to help the poor, by raising and distributing money; enabling them to survive at a substantial level. (69)

      What does this have to do with nationalism then? Having briefly presented the life in the slum and the conditions of the impoverished crofters, it is not likely that any of these segments of the population have had any notion of bigger political issues, such as benefits/drawbacks of the relationship between Great Britain and Scotland. Thus a common consciousness of what was in Scotland's or the Scots' best interests were, when seen through the eyes of nationalism, no possible way of being part of the every-day life of workers, crofters or unemployed; they had enough problems of their own.

6.2.4 The Disruption of 1843

      During the nineteenth century, Scotland witnessed a row of serious social problems; the break-up of the Church of Scotland - which hitherto had controlled important social tasks (i.e. education and poor relief) - proved to be an important factor, as the Free Church of Scotland began to build a series of new churches all over the country. (70)

      The new houses of God were not the only area in which the new church made alterations. Education had, up until 1843, been under the jurisdiction of the Church of Scotland, being the national church this was one of the obligations which had to be taken care of - this, however, also changed with the division of the two churches. The Free Church had to create social and educational networks similar to the ones already existing, in order to be able to offer its followers the same opportunities as the Church of Scotland. (71)

      Following the construction of several new churches, and the education of children according to the conviction of Free Church, a college was build in 1850, in order to train and educate ministers accordingly. (72) This is to be seen as a counterpart to the first colleges built by the Church of Scotland. (73) One must bear in mind that the new church movement had to construct an entirely new foundation to achieve the same goals as the established church.

      Up until this point, education had been under the control of parishes throughout the nation; which - again - was controlled by the Church of Scotland. With the Disruption, this power withered, and at the end of the day Scotland had two different educational systems.

      Moreover, a kind of national "racism" was emerging from within the middle-class (from the 1810s onwards, middle-class members of congregations objected to attending churches close to disease-ridden "slum" areas); this evolves into a further separation of the classes and is described further on, by Fraser and Morris: "Two Short-term solutions were frequent whitewashing of churches, and the removal of gratis and low-priced pews". (74) Thus, poor people were not "rich" enough to attend church. The solutions were - as said in the quote - short-term, because in the long run, middle-class churches moved to the suburbs. (75)

      So the Disruption separated the Church in two, but did this have any influence on the dwelling nationalism.

      The disruption, as such, adds no concrete information concerning the development of nationalism, but it creates the foundation of the next chapter (6.2.5), as the educational system inevitably plays an important role in the creation of a national identity. Furthermore, it gives a picture of a society in which the strong middle-class represses the poor, to obtain a better standard of living.

6.2.5 The Scottish Educational System

      The problem about the Scottish educational system until the education act in 1872 is to be found earlier in history. As this lies out of the scope of this part of the study, it will only be described briefly. Lynch puts it this way:

      "Indeed, the Education Act of 1669, far from producing a framework which would eventually lead to a school in every Lowland parish, marked the acknowledgement of what had already largely been achieved over the course of the previous century." (76)

      What is said here is that even though it was called an education act, there were no new concrete regulations, as to how education were to be practised; it only provided a passing of what was already happening, namely the making of a school in every parish.

      There was a school in almost every parish, and the parishes were controlled by the Church of Scotland - until the Disruption. This is probably one of the reasons why the church was able to split up in the first place. Because there were no certain regulations dictating how pupils should be taught, and no "road maps" regarding education as such, it would be fairly easy for the New Church to establish an educational system of their own, without compromising any written conventions agreed by the Scottish government. This was also the case with other branches of the religious life in Scotland; in theory just about anybody could start a school, this would "only" take an interested crowd of people, who would make their children attend. Of course, this is very roughly put, but nonetheless this was to a wide extent what the Scottish educational system consisted of, before the Educational act in 1872.

      In Fraser and Morris it is described brief and to the point: "The crucial turning point came with the passing of the 1872 Education (Scotland) Act. This act brought at least a dozen different types of school under state control." (77)

      The change from church to state control of the school meant an organisation of school boards, which were controlled from the Scotch Education Department (SED) in London. (78) This makes one wonder; if Scotland were to form any kind of national consciousness, the education of her "children" would be a good place to start.

      The education children goes through will, in one way or the other, mirror some sort of cultural influence; defining the history and traditions of the given place. We do not have to look farther than to ourselves: we have been taught history, music and Christianity ever since our first day in school. The contents of the education we receive is carefully described by the Ministry of Education, and gives us a picture not only of our own culture, but also of various other cultures throughout the world.

      Compared with the lack of development of Scotch nationalism, what is the relevance then? First of all, Scotland has been without the above mentioned factors to contribute to a common learning, before 1872. But it was not until 1885 that the SED got its own secretary - Henry Craik - marking a higher degree of independence from the similar English Education Department. (79) One could then suspect that it would not be seen as very co-operative, if Scottish education meant teaching the pupils about how Scotland would do just fine without the interference of Great Britain. This, of course, is speculation - however, it could be a probable factor, among several, as to why nationalism has dwelt in Scotland. Furthermore, it was the middle class and the people better off who to a wide extent decided on behalf of the Scottish people.

6.2.6 Social Conditions in Scotland

      The duality that emerged with the separation of the church, did not only raise problems concerning education; there were also a large number of poor people to take into consideration. The national church had lost its authority concerning the parishes which had taken care of the poor, and seen to their well-being. The Free Church had to build up an entirely new organisation, in order to avoid leaving the poor to themselves and their fate.

      It was the church itself that took care of the poor people of Scotland; no governmental aids were provided, so the small-time business of hiring out coffin covers at funerals, together with private donations at Kirk-sessions, (80) did not fulfil the needs of the poor at all.

      Up to this point in time (1845) a Poor Act had existed for a couple of years. It was a poor Poor Act, so to speak; the contents of it allowed the poor to receive economical aid from the church, aid founded on the above.

      Here it would be fair to say that being poor and living of the money received only because of other people's compassion, during the years from the Disruption in 1843 to the Poor Act of 1845, was a terrible destiny. The relief, paid and measured out by the church, came in uneven doses, and must have had a serious psychological, as well as physiological, effect on the people surviving on it. If donations were few and small for, say, a fortnight or so, it affected a great many people. Imagine living on donations and charity, and never be able to know whether you would receive enough money to support your family or not. Add to this the frustration it must have been for the laid off workers, to live an empty life in misery without much of a hope for the future. In the end, the widespread state of mind would most certainly have been one of hopelessness.

      The point here is that when living of practically nothing, and surviving through the next day is the only perspective in life, there is no way that one can gather enough initiative or strength to try to move on, or broaden the perspectives on life. This, held up against the huge urbanisation and overcrowding of the cities, does not apply hope or notion of a collective mind concerning Scotland.

      As this examination develops, it becomes more and more obvious that this period of Scottish history raises no important nationalistic initiatives. Bearing in mind that the bourgeoisie, as mentioned, was very much satisfied with the way things were, it is not so difficult to understand the lack of community spirit between the Scots. The two diverging ways of perceiving the Scottish society were truly a conflict of interests.

      For the bourgeoisie it did not matter to try to make people gather around a nationalistic theme; apparently they were quite satisfied with the partnership with Great Britain, as presented earlier, whereas the working class and the poor had no possible way of starting a national movement - what should they base it on? As stated earlier, no common educational system, which could provide the Scots with a shared notion of being a part of a nation, had existed in Scottish history.

      Besides the problems in the urbanised areas of Scotland, the Highlands had problems of their own to handle. The Disruption had great impact on the highlanders; they saw it as an opportunity to dissociate from the landowners and their kind (81) - a class diversion in which the peasantry of the rural areas of Scotland found a haven free from their "superiors".

      For a time, the Free Church was in fact a sanctuary for the crofters and other low-paid parts of society, but eventually this was a short-term relief from the upper-middle classes, who were fast in taking over the important posts of the new church. The Free Church consisted mainly of younger people, allowing the better economic founded classes to move in on the new "territory" and take control. (82)

      This "take over" of the Free Church by the better classes resulted in a further secularisation of the social layers of Scotland. What had begun - or at least become, as the church attended mainly by the workers of the nation - was soon to be set apart from these people. It is peculiar how this diversion between the different civic groups in Scotland was manifested; even though most of the people fulfilled, or had fulfilled, a place in society.

6.2.7 General Perspective 1832-1914

      To summarise on the above, we see a Scottish society facing enormous internal problems. A society where the immediate focus would be inwards, regarding the working class and the poor, because they had enough trouble keeping themselves alive, when living at the breadline.

      As it goes for the bourgeoisie, they had a perfectly good existence, the gap between the classes was widening, allowing lesser contact down the social layers. For the bourgeoisie, economic matters were equally important as the social gap; there seemed to be no points of complaint, nothing leading to dissatisfaction with the British government.

      The industrial revolution came to play an important role in this century. Even though it evolved slowly from branch to branch of the industry, these industries witnessed an asymmetrical "golden age", i.e. when one industry was successful, the other was in decline, or had not yet been brought up to date with technology.

      Finally the Disruption in 1843, and the Education Act of 1872, marked some large turning points in Scottish history. A national church which, at least for a while, looses its undivided control of the parishes, and the benefits to the poor. And an educational system that goes from church control to state control, thus being standardised and supervised by a school board, was also a major change for the established church.

      Disruption is the overall term, which covers not only the church problems, but most certainly Scotland in the nineteenth century as such. Massive industrial, and following social, problems characterises this period of the history of Scotland.

6.3 1914 - 1960

6.3.1 The Economy Situation in the Years 1914 - 1922

      In the years leading up to the first World War, several factors interacted in a way which meant that Scotland found herself on the verge of devolution. The Liberals were in power at Whitehall, largely confirmed by the Scots, and they were about to legislate on Irish Home Rule. Gaelic culture was on advance, and long lasting disputes within the Church had finally been settled. Was nationalism in the air or was trouble lurking in the seemingly calm waters? The following historical outlines and figures will be based on Christopher Harvie's "No Gods and Precious Few Heroes".

      Between 1906 and 1908 the Clyde shipbuilding industry had suffered a decline in output in 50% compared to 1905 (83). Also, the almost equally important steel and engineering industries were ailing. These were ominous signs in an economy that was based on eight staple industries - in order of numbers employed: agriculture, coal mining, shipbuilding and engineering, textiles, building, steel and fishing. These eight counted for 60% of the country's industrial output. With a 12,5% output of the UK production compared with the 10,5% of the population, Scottish economy was by all means a comparatively significant factor in British economy. (84) Despite an if not unhealthy, then pale looking, economy, Scotland did not hesitate in throwing her sons into the War, which broke out on the 4th of August 1914. Though seemingly enthusiastic about the War engagement (if this is possible), seen by the fact that Scotland mobilised 22 out of the 157 battalions that made up the British Expeditionary Force, "the wartime threat to an exporting economy soon came to be a fore". (85) Panic spread because of the fear that the War would lead to disastrous conditions for a number of industrial areas, and unemployment would, subsequently, rise. This panic soon abated, though, as the German offensive on the Western front came to a halt. In the Glasgow Herald, Unionist MP Sir William Raeburn stated:

      "The War has falsified almost every prophesy. Food was to be an enormous price [sic] unemployment rife [...] revolution was to be feared. What are the facts? The freight market [...] is now active and prosperous [...] prices of food have risen very little, and the difficulty at present is to get sufficient labour, skilled and unskilled. We have not only maintained our own trades, but have been busy capturing our enemies'." (86)

      But was this optimistic statement true? It seems not. The Textile industry was immediately hit by the rising of charges in freight and insurances by 30-40%. (87) The coal mining was also affected instantaneously, because the German market - which consisted of 2,9 mill. tons (88) - obviously disappeared, and along with it the Baltic market. Also enlistment resulted in a grave decline of efficiency, because of the condition of the remaining miners, who were either less skilled, too old or in poor physical shape. The fishing industry was struck, again because its main importers of herring were Germany and Russia. The War's affection on fishing resulted in an enormous flow of fishermen into the Royal Naval Reserve.

      Industries that gained from the War appeared to be the shipbuilding and the munitions industry in general. But while these industries had a positive effect on the employment situation, they dealt with a production of a limited future, and when the War ended in 1918 so did the orders that had kept the Clyde Yards busy. It was soon to become evident that the War would leave Scottish economy scarred for many years to come.

      Now, should Scotland not have grabbed the opportunity to use the negative side effects of the War, to elaborate further on the ideas of Home Rule that had dawned before the outbreak of the War? The War had seen an enormous sacrifice from the Scots with an estimated loss of around a 100.000 men, according to the National War Memorial White Paper (89). At 5% of the male population this nearly doubled the British average. (90) The capital from the expanded munitions industry had moved south, and likewise the control of much of the Scottish business. English banks had taken over several Scottish banks, and those that were not overtaken had switched much of their investment into government stocks, or down south to more profitable commercial concerns. This made the Glasgow Herald, who was usually no friend to nationalism, state: "That ere long the commercial community will be sighing for a banking William Wallace to free them from southern oppression." (91)

      As mentioned earlier, most Scottish industries had suffered during the War. The War had brought a new desolation to the Highlands. The forests were chopped down and death and migration had put an end to several industries. Schemes were made to restore the area: plantation of new forests, building of railways and an industrialisation of the islands after a Scandinavian pattern, constructed around deep sea fishery. But the carrying out of these plans was dependant on a continuing British economic prosperity.

      The plans for a reorganisation of the railways were of critical importance. The newly created Minister of Transport suggested a nationalisation of the railways, with a separate Scottish region that was supposed to be autonomous. But as this scheme would put an extraordinary strain on the Scottish railways, as already seen during the War, when there was national control. This lead to an upgrade in maintenance and wages with resulting rise in expenses. A separate Scottish company would be forced to uphold these standards, even though it was only carrying a little more than half the tons of traffic, compared with the English railway. (92) This would, all in all, make the Scottish system uneconomical. The result of this schism was a campaign headed by a coalition of Scottish MPs from both the Labour, the Liberal and the Conservative parties "in which the rhetoric of nationalism" (93) was used to secure an amalgamation of Scottish and English railways.

      When summing up the data from Harvie, the two quotations from the Glasgow Herald in the above are in themselves quite interesting, and so is the line where Harvie says that the rhetoric of nationalism was used. Both extracts from the Herald are associated with economic matters, and they could be seen as an indication of economy indeed being a factor, when the Scots were consulting themselves on the issue of whether they should be a part of Great Britain or not. There is certainly an amount of ambiguity in the two Herald quotations, and it is a bit difficult not to develop the notion that one is dealing with a certain degree of - opportunism is perhaps too strong a term - but a sense of "what is a good deal for Scotland?"-attitude. The Unionist is saying: "We are part of a state who is at war, things should be awful, but look, things are really not that bad; on the contrary, a lot has improved. We are actually gaining from this war, sans doute, this is a good deal for Scotland." On the other hand, when the Herald is sighing for a banking William Wallace, because Scottish banking assets moved south, there is no question that this is definitely not a good deal for Scotland.

      Regarding the security of the amalgamation of the Scottish and the English railways, it is interesting that nationalism seemed to have been used in the debate over the matter. This indicates that nationalism was considered a weapon, and that it was also being used; and what is perhaps equally important, it appeared to be an effective weapon. Of course, one has to be careful not to extract too many conjectures from a single event (or in this case, a single line), but it is far from unrealistic to assume that the abstain from nationalism, or the threat of introducing it, could be used when best suited.

      It could be interesting to go further on from here, and try to look at the economy as a factor connected with nationalism; especially as it has been indicated previously that the content of the Scottish people seems to be closely related to the economic situation. Hence, again, the "sighing for a banking William Wallace", and much later in the century the campaign "It is Scotland's Oil", described in chapter 6.4.1 to present period of this examination. If one wants to look at the economy as a case for nationalism, useful information can be picked up from R. H. Campbell's "The Economic Case for Nationalism" in "The Roots of Nationalism in Europe" (94). Campbell explains that there must be present some sort of indications that the country or region that is being dealt with was facing either economic problems, or opportunity; this, of course, must be recognised by the contemporary society, and political arrangements had to be made, in order to deal efficiently with the problem or opportunity. Symptoms of an economic problem in Scotland is often judged - by both contemporaries and historians - by means of comparing Scotland with other parts of the United Kingdom. The differences in achievement (that is, if the differences were negative from a Scottish point of view) would be a fine parameter for discontent. Nationalism could then be seen as a political response to the persistence of regional inequality. The political remedies to deal with these inequalities would call for active intervention by either a devolved or independent administration.

      As noted at the beginning of this part, Scotland had been close to a vote on devolution, but though economic problems were not by all means a novelty, they had not been a case for nationalism before 1914. Until then, governmental interventions had been of a social character, displayed in this trietie's post 1832 period, where the major issues were social welfare and the educational system. With this in mind, it would be fair to assert that actions concerning economy were not considered functions of the government, before 1914. It was only incidentally that economic issues appeared in nationalist political forms. Campbell writes:

      "The Scots were not inclined to favour home rule or nationalism, but whether they did so or not, their attitudes were determined not by economic but by other issues. What ever the reality of an economic case for nationalism in Scotland before 1914, none was imagined". (95)

      One does only have to look at the election of 1918. There are hardly any indications that the Scots were not pro Union. The Scottish electorate had risen from 779.012 at the 1910 election to 2.205.383 in 1918, due to the Representation of the Peoples Act of 1918, which entitled women over 30 to vote, plus added male voters by a full 50%. (96) But even though Labour had Home Rule on its program, and supported it with two distinctively Scottish planks: "The Self - Determination of the Scottish People" and "The Complete Restoration of the Land of Scotland to the Scottish People", it was the Unionists who prevailed with 32 seats in the Commons, as opposed to only seven in 1910. (97) What the Scots did not know yet, was that the period following the War would be a time of an unprecedented depression; and they obviously had paid no heed to the ominous signs of the War's influence on the economy, which the consensus of the 1918 election was clearly a proof of.

6.3.2 The Economy Situation in the Years 1922 - 1960

      Scottish economy was heavily dependent on international trade. A decline in the trade would mean over capacity in shipping and a fall in owner's profit. This again would lead to a reduced number of orders for new ships, and this slump would then spread to the other heavy industries. The shipbuilding industry had in 1921 been hit by the combination of a vanishing naval market, the surplus of products of American shipyards and confiscated enemy ships. Again, in his book "No Gods and Precious Few Heroes", Christopher Harvie is thoroughly presenting how the staple industries are affected by the post War slump. The interesting thing is what was done, in order to try to change the economic downfall. Scotland needed to plan her way out of trouble. In 1930 the Labour government had, though it was considered a purely cosmetic move, encouraged regional industrial development groups, which led to the forming of the Scottish National Development Council (SNDC). The forming of the SNDC later led to the set up of the Scottish Economy Committee (SEC). According to Campbell, neither of these bodies sought a cure for Scotland's ills by nationalist political solutions, and many of those who were actively involved in them, joined in a comprehensive condemnation of any form of home rule. (98) But at the same time the secretary of the committee justifies its existence by stating: "It is undoubtedly true that Scotland's national economy tends to pass unnoticed in the hands of the Ministry of Labour and the Board of Trade". (99) According to Campbell, the importance of the legal and the administrative in the years between the wars grew, because increasing legislation required more Scottish statutes. The move of the administration to St. Andrew's House was considered an important act, but while well coming the move in 1937, Walter Elliot - the Secretary of State then - feared the changes:

      "[...] will not in themselves dispose of the problems whose solution a general improvement in Scottish social and economic conditions depends [...] it is the consciousness of their existence which is reflected in, not in the small and unimportant Nationalist Party, but in the dissatisfaction and uneasiness amongst moderate and reasonable people of every view or rank - a dissatisfaction expressed in every book published about Scotland now for several years". (100)

      By this statement Campbell argues that Elliot had identified the source of discontent in the 1930s. "As government began to play an increasingly interventionist role in the economy, it became easy to advocate a nationalist remedy to ensure that it was in what ever was deemed Scotland's interest". (101) As before 1914, Campbell continues, the easy conditions of world trade after 1945 made Scottish industry prosper, and any need for drastic political interventions were postponed until the late 1950s, when the economic progress of Scotland started to deteriorate, and some of the giants in shipbuilding and engineering were forced to shut down. But even if the decline in the late 1950s meant an increasing degree of intervention from governmental side, there was no evidence of any other political change. Even the Scottish Council's inquiry into the Scottish economy in 1960 was specific: "The proposal for a Scottish Parliament [...] implies constitutional changes of a kind that place it beyond our remit although it is fair to say that we do not regard it as a solution". (102)

      It should now, based on the previous, be evident that Scotland's economy in most of the period found itself in a poor state. The measures done in order to deal with Scotland's economic problems do not necessarily have to do with devolution; but it is easy to think that devolution ,or even independence, would make them more effective. The answer to why the Scots have not used the economy as a case for nationalism is probably impossible to give, but there appears to lack a genuine belief in whether it would really make a difference. Campbell puts it in a very direct way: "There is little evidence that Scots were generally interested in nationalism other than for the economic benefits it might bring". (103) Again, as previously implied, opportunism seems to be a major factor; especially when one thinks of how the discovery of oil in the Scottish part of the North Sea would spawn nationalistic feelings in the post 1960s period.

6.3.3 The Literary Renaissance

      While the post 1914 period appears to have been devoted to the economic questions and problems of Scotland, it also saw the birth of a Scottish literary renaissance in the 1924-1934 decade.

      In the late 18th and 19th century industrialisation had swept across Scotland with great speed, and because of the swiftness the evolution of society sort of jumped some steps of the ladder. In his book "The Break up of Britain", Tom Nairn explains that the intelligentsia was overwhelmed by the growth of the Scottish industrial revolution, and the new entrepreneurial bourgeoisie linked to it. It was "deprived of its typical nationalist role. [...] There was no call for its usual services". (104) These services would normally lead the nation to the threshold of political independence. So the, indeed, very well known intelligentsia of Scotland was operating on an entirely different stage, but according to Nairn, it was not really Scottish at all. It was "so striking non-nationalist - so detached from the People, so intellectual and universalising in its assumptions, so Olympian in its attitudes". (105) As a contrast, or perhaps a reaction to this, an entirely different literary "school" erupted in the late 19th century: the Kailyard. Tom Nairn writes:

      "Kailyardism was the definition of Scotland as consisting wholly of small towns full of small-town 'characters' given to bucolic intrigue and wise sayings. At first central figures were usually Ministers of the Kirk (as were most of the authors) but later on, schoolteachers and doctors got into the act. There housekeepers always have a shrewd insight into human nature. Offspring who leaves for the big city frequently come to grief, and are glad to get home again (peching and hosting to hide their feelings). In their different ways, village cretins and ne'er-do-wells reinforce the essentially healthy weltanschauung of the place." (106)

      Along with Tartanry, Kailyard has come to represent what Nairn calls "cultural sub-nationalism". (107) One can say the Kailyard literature, and the garish symbols of Tartanry, fortified each other and became a sort of substitute for nationalism. The parochialism of the Kailyard, and the myths of an irreversible past of the Tartanry, came to represent a politically impotent nationalism.

      One of the first to recognise this "lack of teeth" was the poet Christopher Murray Grieve, synonymous with Hugh MacDiarmid. MacDiarmid, both a nationalist and a socialist, saw the parochialism of the Scottish literature as a sign of English hegemony, hence it had to be destroyed. He tried to do this through his poetry, and even invented his own language Lallans (Lowland Scots), which was constructed from Scots Gaelic and English. (108) MacDiarmid's "crusade" brought along other writers and poets, like Lewis Grassic Gibbon and Edwin Muir; but this literary renaissance lasted only for about ten years. In his thesis about Tartanry, Robert C. Thomsen explains that it could be that many considered it a phenomenon of the elite, and thus it did not have an appeal to the general public. They either did not understand it, or they simply were not interested. (109) Another reason, Thomsen argues, could be that the Kailyard and Tartanry still had a very firm grip of the Scots.

6.3.4 Summary

      To briefly sum up the period of 1914-60, there is evidently, at least if one is focusing on the economy, a profound lack of will and enthusiasm amongst the majority of the Scots, to engage themselves in any action that might be considered nationalistic. It has been attempted to examine why the Scots - despite what turned out to be an ailing economy - failed to overcome the cultural sub-nationalism (or pseudo-nationalism, as we term it). Apart from a few authors and poets from the brief literary renaissance, the period reflects a peculiar combination of reluctance and laissez-faire attitude.

6.4 1960 - Present Day

6.4.1 "The Sleeping Political Giant" - The Working-Class and Nationalism

      Scotland was - and still is - a nation mostly consisting of labourers, as established in chapter 6.2.2. Scotland had come to rely firmly on the presence of heavy industry, and the majority of common Scots shared a working-class identity underneath - or perhaps even above, as could be seen in the later (during the 1980s) attempt to create a new Scottish identity out of the common history of working-class struggle; e.g. Red Clydeside (110) - the dual Scottish/British identity. With such a large part of Scottish livelihood depending on the success of the country's industrial capacities, it is clear that a notable political force inevitably became linked with this social class; a working-class uprising would be a Scottish uprising - Nationalism throughout the working-class would be Scottish nationalism in its full potential.

      If a united Scotland were to stand together and demand either devolution or, at the very least, a thorough reassessment of the Anglo-Scottish relationship, it would presumably be very hard for the British political administration to simply ignore. But this was still not the case in Scotland; nationalism flourished only in small intellectual circles - as was discussed in chapter 6.3.3 - though the intelligentsia repeatedly admonished the working-class for not appreciating the fact that dissociation with Britain was, according to them, the only way to improve the situation in Scotland. (111)

      The essential industry had been in great demand during the post-war period, but as Europe slowly recovered from the lingering impacts of war, old competitors became active again, while the need for heavy industry continued to diminish. Scottish industry had failed to reorientate, hence unemployment rose steadily, having doubled the number of jobless labourers by the beginning of the 1960s - a tendency which continued in spite of attempts of bringing new industry to Scotland were undertaken. (112)

      Furthermore - since the rest of Britain also suffered from economic recession, and thus needed to review every expense - the infrastructure of Scotland became somewhat neglected, as "remote" (from a Westminster point of view), unprofitable railroad lines were shut down to minimise maintenance costs. (113)

      This development left an increasing number of Scots with little more than a sense of isolation and being disregarded. Dissatisfaction, not surprisingly, started growing, as the social and economical decline wore on - to Scotland it could only appear as if central England were rebuilding its strength on behalf of its conceived provinces.

      Discontent has always provided fertile soil for most forms of radicalism, including nationalism. The somewhat rash argument often goes: "If things are not well, it must be someone's fault - and more likely Theirs than mine". In this case the perceived culprits would be either (or both) the political parties representing - but failing to do something for - the common Scotsman, or the entire British construct of remote, centralised administration starving out the regions. (114) In an economical context, this tendency for discontent to create opposition is called the "feelgood factor", and John Curtice, Senior Lecturer in Politics at Strathclyde University, has described its principal workings in the following words:

      "The key to the outcome of elections is the state of the economy. If voters have plenty of money in their pockets, they feel good about the economy and will support the government. If they have less money in their pockets, they lose confidence in the economy, and will vote the government out." (115)

      But though a desire for change did begin to emerge - an inclination also demonstrated by the fact that the Scottish National Party (SNP) received wider support from the working-class through the 1960s (116) - the Scots could hardly be said to even attempt to vote out the government (during the 1960s there were only minor fluctuations in the support for the established parties) (117), and it is peculiar that, still, it never came to any real, popular confrontations with the "adversaries" in Westminster. One inevitably gets the impression that the Scots might very well be discontent, but were even more uneasy at the prospect of confronting the central British government. A status quo appears to have been preferred to the uncertainties any changes would bring.

      The uneasiness felt is understandable, and as Tom Gallagher has commented, inter-war periods have shown how recession breeds resignation rather than defiant radicalism. (118) The reason for the apparent lack of political influence by the "feelgood factor" could probably be explained by this general absence of faith in the future, there not being any obvious ways out of the decline. There was no guarantee that the working people's standard and quality of living was not to deteriorate any further, if they sought to break up with Britain. Talk of a devolved parliament might chafe Westminster unnecessarily, potentially cutting Scotland off from vital UK subsidiaries. And as for the case of independence - what was Scotland, still relying greatly on obsolete heavy industry, to live on? Total independence could pledge no promises of improved conditions, but would inevitably mean a number of new expenses, like the need for the establishment of costly institutions as military and defence.

      It appears that the people at this point felt no particular ideological need for a higher degree of political independence; what they wanted was just better social and employment conditions. Preferably, one suspects, without too much of the insecurity and responsibility that would inevitably follow the possible channelling of their discontent into a political momentum.

      In 1970, however, something happened that provided a possible solution to the very real economical problems facing a potentially independent Scotland. Large quantities of oil (Scotland now claims to possess 70% of Europe's energy reserves) (119) was discovered in what would be Scotland's own territorial waters, had she not been a part of the UK. The Scots felt, more than ever, exploited by central Britain, as they saw little of the oil revenues (which primarily went to Britain), and the economic recession continued. (120) The conviction that the new oil industry might be able to support an independent Scottish nation was the cue for advocates of autonomy to launch into one of the first rather successful nationalistic campaigns. The SNP proclaimed "It's Scotland's Oil", campaigning for total independence, and their public support soared to no less than 30% of the Scottish electorate in the 1974 October election (a mere 6.4% behind the established Labour party), giving them 11 MPs in Westminster. (121) It seemed that Scottish nationalism had finally had its breakthrough, and that the newly discovered economical foundation would allow the discontent caused largely by the "feelgood factor" to play its part, making Scotland actively oppose the established government.

      In the following years the nationalistic tendencies were so pronounced that, finally, in 1979, a Scottish/Welsh devolution referendum took place (both the Tories and Labour were essentially unionists, having shown little enthusiasm for devolution hitherto). (122) With such a large number of Scots supporting the SNP, the other parties could simply not afford to ignore the issue, if they were to keep their voters. But - again - it became apparent that the Scots were truly a divided people, and that there was, evidently, a rather significant difference between what the common Scotsman said and what he actually did (a Scottish national covenant demanding an intra-UK parliament in Scotland had received over two million signatures) (123). Forced to make the choice between stability and risk, only a very narrow majority of 52% of the voters voted pro-devolution, but only 32.9% of the entire Scottish electorate ayed, and Westminster required this figure to be at least 40% for the election outcome to be valid. (124) Nationalists were shocked at the displayed magnitude of political indifference among the common voters; they had apparently failed to reach and motivate the people - whose support was all it would have taken - after all.

      In a matter as supposedly important as the devolution of the nation (which was, even if not total independence, a clear step towards a looser interlocked Britain that might ultimately mean the break up of the UK) (125), one would certainly not expect the result to be so unclear. The poll was not as large as might be expected, and the voters were clearly torn between the two options. Hence, the possible explanation of Scottish nationalism having been kept in check largely by economical worries becomes improbable. With Scotland claiming as much as 70% of the EU's energy reserves, largely in the newly found oil fields, (126) one would expect dormant nationalism - had it really been there - to immediately take advantage of this fact, voting in favour of making Scotland an independent nation, or at least loosen the ties to Britain through devolution. This did not happen, much - it appeared - to Scotland's own surprise, as well as that of the detached spectator, and this threw the Scots into something of an identity crisis. (127) The Scottish political scientist James Kellas argued that:

      "[...] what the Scots and the politicians did in early 1979 was to expose the essential ambiguity of the United Kingdom: its multi-national yet homogenous nature, its conflicts based on nation as well as class; and its balance between élite and mass initiatives in politics." (128)

      The outcome indicated that there was no simple, unified "struggle for freedom", and support lent to the active nationalists was gone as quickly as it had appeared. The number of SNP MPs dropped from 11 to only 2 at the following election, as the party had been left somewhat discredited after the referendum. (129) Ever since, through the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the support for the nationalists remained low; in fact the SNP never got more than 3 MPs since that fatal election (130), apart from the most recent general election (at the 1st of May 1997) in which they achieved 6. (131)

      A number of possible explanations for the Scots discarding devolution in the 11th hour, in spite of most people expecting a clear majority in favour, (132) have been suggested. It is possible that the SNP with their separatist course had frightened supporters of a slower dissociation with Britain, thus - again - invoking the fear of a self-governed Scotland standing alone (even in spite of the expected oil revenues) - as Tom Gallagher argues, the structure of Scottish economy "[...] may have created a culture of dependency resistant to the nationalist project which could easily be depicted as entailing a great deal of risk and uncertainty." (133)

      But a possible, perhaps more likely, explanation might also lie in the fact that in order to become an independent country, the Scots would need - oil or no oil - to politicise the pseudo-nationalism they had relied on for so long. Or rather: they would need to abandon it altogether, they would have to shed the secure (even if forged) tartan-image - established through Tartanry (see chapter 6.1.2) and Kailyard (see chapter 6.3.3), and reinforced by the tourist ideas of Scotland held by foreigners as well as by the Scots themselves - replacing it with a more mature form of identity. (134) They would have to give up the conventional idea of England being the ultimate foe causing all the problems, and start governing instead of girning, with all the responsibilities this brings. It is probably not particularly enjoyable to confront the tartan reflecting mirror and resign one's identity - indeed, it can seem a frightening prospect - but this will most likely have to be done sooner or later, anyhow, lest Scotland be resigned to her current role in Britain as in the world.

      During the late 1990s, SNP support has been climbing slowly again, possibly because of SNP's "Independence in Europe" campaign - this will be discussed in detail in the following chapter (6.4.2). The most recent election (at the 1st of May 1997) gave SNP 22% of the Scottish vote, and 6 seats in Westminster. (135) Yet, plans for Scottish (and Welsh) devolution are being made by the new Labour government, and the Scottish referendum is expected to take place soon - on the second or third Thursday in September 1997. (136) Again, devolution is on the agenda, and the future will show whether the Scots have reached a more homogenous attitude towards it; but it is widely expected (again, one is tempted to say; underlining the uncertainty factor always present in opinion polls) that Scotland opts for devolution this time.

      The intelligentsia - frustratedly - still laments the failure for the working-class to involve itself in the political scene. Of course the majority has to have the final word; an intellectual minority or organisations like the SNP must accept that they cannot dictate the people what they need. They do not have a monopoly on nationalism either, as Tom Gallagher says, (137) their particular interpretation being but one. But if Scotland is to break the status quo, it is not enough that a negligible amount of intellectuals and die hard nationalists proclaim "This is best for Scotland" (as, indeed, the SNP has done) (138) - it requires the bulk of the population, the common Scotsman, to actually want it, to be self-confident, involved and enthusiastic. (139) As Tom Gallagher has put it:

      "To those with no commitment to the established political order, the Scottish working class is a sleeping political giant, but it is one that has obstinately refused to waken up and flex its collective muscles, however often it may have stirred in its sleep." (140)

      Maybe now it is fully rested and ready for awakening. Maybe it will continue to dwell. Either way it is - ultimately - its own decision.

6.4.2 "Independence in Europe" - The European Union and Nationalism

      Through the last decade many Scottish nationalists have caught sight of a new way of trying to achieve status of an independent nation, by means of the European Union (EU). The goal is to gain "Independence in Europe", as the catch phrase of the campaign launched by the SNP goes, (141) and it appears that the EU then becomes instrumental in the "struggle" (or, rather, passive demand) (142) for a higher degree of independence; an accessory for dissociation with Britain.

      But what exactly is it the EU can provide that the Scots cannot accomplish in (or through) the UK, and is the goal of independence within Europe really more than an old nationalist's dream of easy escape from the increasingly "Divided Kingdom" (as John Osmond wittily as well as describingly has named his book on the contemporary problems facing the UK) (143) - another way of evading confrontation with Britain (a confrontation that could, perhaps, have a positive outcome, as will be discussed later)?       There are a number of paradoxes tied to the idea of Scottish nationalists advocating a construct like the EU - at least if one accepts the recurrent arguments for breaking up with Britain presented hitherto. The EU is an equalising, centrally administered union of nations (or, at least, states), in which recent development has shown an increasing amount of the participating nations' sovereignty is being placed. One might argue that the "Caledonian Antisyzygy" (as the Scottish union of opposites has been termed) (144) would be likely to live on in an EU context, in form of a European/Scottish incongruity replacing the British/Scottish. And perhaps the discrepancies would even be stronger, since - after all - the peoples of Britain are inevitably linked by hundreds of years of historical events; unpleasant as it may appear to the conservative nationalist (with the view that most of Scotland's problems are caused by the English), the interests and background of a Scotsman is more likely to converge with that of an Englishman, than those of another, arbitrary people of the EU. It can seem as if nationalists urging a Scotland within the EU have either a "the goal justifies the means"-attitude towards separation from the UK, or, alternatively, a whole new angle on nationalism; a new goal altogether, the driving force not being an innate desire not to be part of Britain, but a firm belief that Scotland has a lot to gain from participation in the EU. The possibility that Scotland is merely drawn towards the EU in the same way so many other European nations appear to be must, of course, not be outruled either.

      In a collection of essays on "Nationalism in the Nineties", Isobel Lindsay - Sociologist and member of the SNP - comments on these issues, aware of the apparent inconsistencies as well as the fact that the SNP seems to have paid too little attention to the rationale of these. She shows how the established notions of Scottish nationalism cannot account for the new SNP goal, by summarising key aspects of nationalism in Scotland as being (or having been): (145)

      Of these central aspects, as Isobel Lindsay argues, only the fourth appears to fit readily into an EU context. (146) Even so, the current, official SNP policy on Europe clearly states the SNP's advocation of a Scotland in the EU:

      "The Scottish National Party declares its unshakeable belief in Scotland's destiny as a European nation and reaffirms its belief that the best course for Scotland to take lies in Independence in Europe [...]" (147)

      The EU has clearly shown (and officials voiced) its visions of becoming far more than a mere economically founded trading union, continuing to move towards a higher level of integration. Scottish nationalists has - time and again - appealed to the inbred notion of the nation being the only natural unification and government of the people, and it is not something belonging merely to the past, as may be exemplified by quoting former SNP MP and journalist George Reid from his 1995 Donaldson Lecture (148): "Throughout Europe and much of the Third World, people have returned for security to that most fundamental form of self-government, the nation." (149) This archaic view on the nature and origin of nations does not converge with the supra-national tendencies of the EU, and the fact that the SNP now advocates the EU warmly could suggest that either a more mature SNP has shed its romantic Tartan image (the antiquated identity - discussed in chapter 6.1.2 - based on brave and bold military traditions still lingers on in modern nationalists) (150) to participate in the post-traditional era, (151) or they might simply - as Tom Gallagher suspects - be trying to win the support of that apparently large amount of Scots still fearing an independent Scotland might bring isolation and stagnation. (152)

      Another discrepancy is the often voiced anti-UK argument of having to conform to rules conceived outside Scotland, to legislation representing larger interests than the Scottish. "The time has now come when one has to recognise the reality of the divergence of the political pattern of the south of England from Scotland [...]", said Robin Cook, Labour MP, in 1983, (153) also showing that not only the nationalist party was concerned over the differences of Scottish and central British interests. It was unsatisfactory for Scotland to keep voting Labour and getting a Tory government, this effectively showed that a remote administration could not appreciate the needs of the provinces. A membership of the EU will obviously bring a large number of legislative obligations, many of which are aimed at protecting interests superseding the individual nation (namely - to a wide extent - the unobstructed run of the market mechanisms). Further integration into the EU will also inevitably mean a larger bureaucratic machinery, bringing power significantly farther away from the people.

      As for the EU being a means through which to achieve a state more socialist in its values and norms, it also seems unprobable that this would be the best way to achieve this. As mentioned in the latter, EU directives are often intended to ensure that no interests interfere with the free market (which is no longer confined to the buying and selling of commodities, but also applied to social areas) (154). As Isobel Lindsay argues, the acceptance of EU on this matter might be based on the assumption that the UK government will always be Conservative (or at least always right of a possible Scottish government) (155) and the EU would, at the very least, provide the possibility of a system change. But if a devolved Scottish parliament were to be introduced, this would almost certainly mean a more realistic way towards the Left of the working Scots. Perhaps not in its initial form - depending on how much legislative power would be invested in this parliament - but ultimately. The fundamentally capitalistic ideas of the EU are not likely to follow a Left trajectory (quite the opposite), but a parliament representing the population - even if inside the UK - could. Especially if Britain stood together and renovated the antiquated electoral system, which - in its current form - cannot be said to represent the people very sincerely.

      What becomes apparent is the fact that the EU to a great extent seems to be regarded as "the easy way out" - or at least "sold" to the people that way. Even if the SNP really believes that the EU will be a union so fundamentally different from that of the UK (and it has to be stressed that this is not something members of the SNP agree fully upon, as exemplified by Isobel Lindsay's questioning discourse), Europe will inevitably bring about a new set of problems; and this is something carefully ignored by the SNP in their campaigning.

      The UK is unpopular, but perhaps the problem really lies with the status quo of Britain. Instead of stating that the UK is unpopular and fails to represent the Scots in a satisfying manner, one could say that the UK in its current form is unpopular. It might be noted, that the EU is not particularly popular with the people either. Before the 1989 Euro Elections, quoting Isobel Lindsay:

      "[...] a clear majority of Scottish respondents thought that the EC had reduced Scotland's control over her destiny, failed to make Scotland more prosperous than she would otherwise have been and had made food prices go up." (156)

      So why not seriously try to improve the construct of the UK (the electoral system, among other things), instead of trying to find a route of escape from the declining Britain?

      If Scotland succeeds in joining a new union in order to flee an old, this might very well prove to be something of a Pyrrhic victory. A temporary victory only, as it will become apparent that the EU is not a haven in which all problems vanish. If the attitude towards the state of the nation is to hide (under the wings of pseudo-nationalism, for instance) or run (by always blaming the UK and turning to another construct, the EU, for a solution) instead of facing the trouble, there will really be little difference between what the EU can provide and what could be attained inside the UK.

      It is, put simply, the people themselves that determine their constitutional status - the Scots are living in no tyranny - and thus the EU as an escape route (from separatism and from the UK) has, borrowing Isobel Lindsay's words, "more superficial plausibility than it has substance." (157)

6.4.3 "New or Old Nationalism?" - Neo-Nationalism in Europe

      It has been commented by some that we are experiencing a new wave of nationalism in Europe, (158) but the nature and source of this neo-nationalism - if, indeed, that is what we are experiencing - is not something generally agreed upon, and the issue is being much debated (as is often the case of such contemporary, unconcluded issues). But when talking about neo-nationalism, one must - at least - realise exactly what one is talking about, as more than one nationalistic trend can be observed:

New Pseudo-Nationalism

      Europe's peoples are indulging in the heritage of their respective national (or "regional", in case of nations consisting of more than one people) identities. Raphael Samuel put it the following way in "The Independent", the 12th of February 1995:

      "'Heritage' is as popular with the general public in the late 20th century as the wonders of science and invention were in the 1870s when, on a Whit Monday, some 70,000 visitors are said to have flocked to Liverpool to see the new warehouses." (161)

      And it is not only abroad that heritage based attractions are on the increase. If we find a clear, cosy, rural Danish lake (resting peacefully under the crowns of old, slanted beeches), in which to mirror ourselves, we would realise that our own country is not that different altogether. This very notion of the idyllic Danish nature (which, of course, barely exists) resembles Kailyard images of Scotland greatly, and we also tend to practice our Viking-roots with as much vigour as the Scots have relished their Gaelic origins. We are, in Denmark, experiencing an upsurge of Viking-societies and Viking reconstructions (Viking ships, Viking houses, etc.); our roots, in other words, are being worshipped as something grand but inevitably lost, as escapism to a romantic era in which times were better and the nation was at its full potential.

      George Reid argues, as Tom Nairn has, that "[...] the new nationalism is a response to globalisation, both reacting against it and feeding on it". (162) It fits well in this context. The peoples of smaller European countries (like Denmark) might very well feel increasingly alienated by the still growing supra-national construct of the EU (as described in chapter 6.4.2), the pseudo-nationalism consequently being an obvious reaction against the superior rule; a way of keeping one's identity and individuality, thus being able to tolerate political supremacy.

      This is, curiously, very much the same thing experienced in Scotland following the Union of 1707, where Tartanry (6.1.2) and Kailyard (6.3.3) later came to play a very significant part in retaining a Scottish identity inside the UK. (163) This suggests that the Scottish pseudo-nationalism is not something unique in itself, but maybe a natural reaction among common people, when they are feeling estranged from a supra-national construct that they feel they cannot quite reject either (e.g. for economical, social or security reasons). What was unique about Scotland, then (on the assumption that the suggested thesis is correct), was the early stage at which the described factors were present - at a time, when the rest of the European nations were busy defining themselves as nations.

New Political Nationalism

      As mentioned, political nationalism is also something being observed in a number of European nations. However, where nationalism was previously used as the glue binding nation-states together (refer to chapter 5), it appears that now it is being used as a means for splitting them up (Belgium and Italy being examples of this).

      Thus, the term neo-nationalism becomes unsatisfactory, as it suggests the revival of established ideas of nationalism, while in reality it may be a whole new form of nationalism. (164) In "Living Marxism", Issue 45, July 1992, it was argued that:

      "[...] traditional national identities can be called into question in this way because they are artificial constructions, created by capitalism as a way of binding people together under the authority of a national elite. The problem facing the rulers of Europe today is the absence of any systematic means through which a wider coherence can be imposed upon society." (165)

      The article suggests that in our post-modern society there remains little to hold together artificially created constructs as nation-states, and hence the established order collapses, as Europe's people face an identity crisis, having to redefine their self and sense of belonging.

      It is also possible to place the latest development of Scotland's nationalism (a term loosing its meaning in this context) in this connexion. If one accepts that we are in a period of post-nationalism (Isobel Lindsay also suggests that this might be the case) (166), one may regard the main reason for the increase of nationalism in Scotland being a growing appreciation of the fact that the political system in its present form simply is no longer satisfactory.

      We witness the same feeling in Denmark as well as other European nations. Particularly in the newer generations - those born into the post-modern period - we witness an increasingly indifferent attitude towards the political system (higher levels of abstention) and the nation as something sacred. (167) Scotland's recent wave of what appears to be political nationalism (but might better be described as post-traditional) might, thus, well be connected with the global detraditionalisation, and part of a not yet concluded development most of Europe is going through.

7. Conclusion

      Having examined the development of Scottish nationalism from 1707 until present day, several factors had to be assessed. We have tried to isolate the most prominent of these, in order to explain why Scotland never developed a conventional form of nationalism.

      In the following, the main points of the four sections of our analysis will be presented, followed by some general conclusive remarks on the possible future of Scottish nationalism.

      Regarding the years 1707-1832, it becomes apparent that the Scots saw the Union as an economic lifebuoy after their failed colonial adventure. There had been no public support for the decision to join, but as economic advantages became evident, opposition faltered, and throughout the rest of the period people were largely content. Hence, it appears there was really no popular interest in independence; the majority of the population benefiting from the industrial revolution following the Union.

      The politically impotent nationalism - reflected in Tartanry - formed an apparently satisfying idea of Scottishness; based on Scottish culture (or, at least, perceived culture), as the stability caused no reason for a political equivalent (most people were quite content to be in the Union). This pseudo-nationality was shaped by the intelligentsia, and as the people needed a national identity to rally round, they embraced it without questioning it.

      The period 1832-1914 meant a lot of changes in Scottish society; changes which allowed only the bourgeoisie to think beyond the daily life, to consider Scottish political matters. The still widening gap between the social strata of Scotland resulted in a divided, rather than a united, people.

      Since few members of the newly formed bourgeoisie did not seem to see any disadvantages in the Scottish/British relationship, there was still no basis for nationalism emerging within Scotland; this would require the participation of the intelligentsia.

      One would have expected the huge social problems marking this century to have been a dominant factor in the development of a nationalistic movement. Seen in the light of the rise of the industrial revolution, and the problems following it, one must say that due to the huge domestic problems, and the acceptance of the British Union, there was really no way nationalism could achieve any significant popular support in Scotland.

      The educational system was also a huge factor, when considering with the lack of nationalism. As there were no regulations, all the different schools had different ways of teaching; thus, there was no possible way uniform education could establish a sense of belonging to a common Scottish society. This is probably why nationalism could not mushroom; there were no national identity to identify with.

      Concerning the period of 1914-1960, our assumption was that the condition of the economy would play a major role in the absence of nationalism. That the fluctuation of the economy would enhance - regardless conditions were either good or bad - the catalysis of nationalism. If conditions were poor, a demand for action (from a devolved or independent government) would rise, to guarantee appropriate measures would be taken in order to deal with the problems. If, on the other hand, things were prosperous, nationalism could be called upon as a protective arrangement to ensure that wealth would remain within the borders of the nation. As most of the period has witnessed an ailing Scottish economy, it would have been the first of the two options that would prevail. But contrary to what was expected, very little was done in order to establish a nationalistic counter to the recession. Was economy a factor then? The expectation was that slump would lead to dissatisfaction and then to nationalism, but this factor proved not to have such influence. It rather looks as though fear of an even worse economy has kept the Scots apprehensive, and thus reluctant to break out of the Union.

      Focusing on factors having kept out nationalism, it might seem strange to look at the literary renaissance of the 1920s, as this is seen as a counterproductive measure against the pseudo-nationalism. But by examining the influence of MacDiarmid and Gibbon, it becomes apparent that the invented traditions of Tartanry and Kailyard had, to some extent, played a part in keeping nationalism at bay.

      The working-class, especially, continued to experience an economical and social crisis through the 1960s, Scotland relying greatly on increasingly obsoleted heavy industry; as the Scottish neo-folk band Wolfstone sings, they became "[...] a working-class people whose work is all done". One would have expected the grave social conditions to spawn some sort of organised opposition to the UK, but though discontent was widespread, nationalistic tendencies could only be observed in small intellectual circles - the majority of Scots never went beyond the established pseudo-nationalism.

      The expected reason for this reluctance to channel the Scottish discontent into a political momentum, was the uncertainty of any improvements coming from a break up with Britain. Things were bad for the common Scotsman, yes, but independence would hardly improve the situation, as Scotland's economy was very much linked with the rest of Britain's.

      However, as the discovery of oil in Scotland's territorial waters would then have provided the lacking economical foundation on which to construct an independent nation state, it appears that this thesis does not hold. Though support for the SNP briefly soared, it appeared that a confrontation with the possible dissociation with the rest of the UK made the Scots revert to their doubtfulness: the referendum on Scottish devolution failed to establish Scottish Home Rule, and the election results depicted a divided people.

      A new image of Scotland has yet to emerge from the Scots identity crisis following that election. It has been suggested that pseudo-nationalism could have played an important, restraining role in the non-development of a more authentic identity; indeed, the devoted nationalists seem to be of this opinion, and continue to find ways of trying to invoke the latent political force of the working-class; the latest being through the EU. However, it appears that maybe most Scots are really quite content with the society pseudo-nationalism provides them. Much scorn might still be poured on Westminster, but it appears that it might rather be a political difference - the Scots being a Labour stronghold, and Britain (until the recent election, May this year) imposing a Tory government - than a national difference; the problem being the inadequate means to make the nation's voice heard in the British parliament, because of the present form of the electoral system.

      It will be interesting to witness the coming devolution referendum in Scotland, and see whether the Scots have really come to an internal agreement of their future identity and their future as a nation, or whether - as Alan Massie suggested in the Sunday Times on May the 4th this year - the current "red tide" of Britain could put United back into the Kingdom.

8. Bibliography

8.1 Literature

Bingham, Caroline : "Beyond the Highland Line", Constable and Company, 1991

Brander, Michael : "The Making of the Highlands", Constable and Company, 1980

Disney, Walt : "Tågefyrsten vender tilbage", Jumbobog 83, Gutenberghus, 1990 { This was an undetected joke... :-) }

Donaldson, William : "The Jacobite Song - Political Myth and National Identity", Aberdeen University Press, 1988

Fladmark, J. M. : "Sharing the Earth", Donhead, 1995

Fraser, W. Hamish - Morris, R. J. : "People and Society in Scotland - Volume II, 1830-1914", John Donald Publishers, 1990

Gallagher, Tom : "Nationalism in the Nineties", Polygon, 1991

Harvie, Christopher : "No Gods and Precious Few Heroes", Edinburgh University Press, 1993

Heelas, Paul - Lash, Scott - Morris, Paul : "Detraditionalization", Blackwell, 1996

Hobsbawm, E. J. : "Nations and Nationalism since 1780", Cambridge, 1992

Jensen, Bernhard Eric : "Det engelske imperium 1688-1850", Den Jydske Historiker, 1991

Lynch, Michael : "Scotland - A New History", Pimlico, 1992

McCrone, David - Kendrick, Stephen - Straw, Pat : "The Making of Scotland - Nation, Culture and Social Change", Edinburg University Press, 1989

Mitchinson, Rosalind : "The Roots of Nationalism: Studies in Northern Europe", John Donald Publishers, 1980

Nairn, Tom : "The Break Up of Britain", Low and Brydone Printers, 1977

Osmond, John : "The Divided Kingdom", Constable, 1988

Pugh, Martin : "State and Society - British Political & Social History 1870-1992", Arnold, 1994

Thomsen, Robert Christian : "Tartanry", Aalborg Universitet, 1995

Østergård, Uffe : "Europas ansigter", Rosinante/Munksgaard, 1992

8.2 Newspapers

Times Newspapers Ltd. : "The Sunday Times", May the 4th 1997

8.3 InterNet

"General Election Results 1997"

"Europe's National Identity Crisis", Living Marxism, Issue 45, July 1992

"What is not happening in Scotland", Living Marxism, Issue 41, March 1992

BBC: "Fast Track Timetable For Devolution"

BBC : "Scottish Election Results (1945 - 1992)"

Curtive, John : "Whatever happened to the Feelgood Factor?"

Reid, George : "Oh, To Be In Britain?", The Donaldson Lecture, September 1995

SNP : "Scottish National Party"

SNP: "SNP Policy - Europe"

9. Notes & References

1 The acceptance of one's nationality - the consciousness of the existance of the nation and one being a part of it.
2 Michael Lynch: "Scotland - A New History", Pimlico, 1992 - p. 406
3 ibid. - p. 386
4 ibid. - p. 424
5 ibid. - p. xi
6 E. J. Hobsbawm: "Nations and Nationalism since 1780", The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1990
7 Anthony D. Smith: "National Identity", Penguin, 1991
8 McCrone, David - Kendrick, Stephen - Straw, Pat : "The Making of Scotland - Nation, Culture and Social Change", Edinburg University Press, 1989
9 Tom Nairn: "The Break-up of Britain", New Left Books, 1977
10 Anthony D. Smith, op.cit. - p. 14
11 E. J. Hobsbawm, op.cit. - p. 8
12 Rosalind Mitchinson: "The Roots of Nationalism: Studies in Northern Europe", John Donald Publishers, 1980 - pp. 1-2
13 David McCrone - Kendrick, Stephen - Straw, Pat : "The Making of Scotland - Nation, Culture and Social Change", Edinburg University Press, 1989 - p. 33
14 William Donaldson: "The Jacobite Song - Political Myth and National Identity", Aberdeen University Press, 1988 - pp. 87-88
15 Uffe Østergård: "Europas ansigter", Rosinante/Munksgaard, 1992 - p. 33
16 Tom Nairn: "The Break Up of Britain", Low and Brydone Printers, 1977 - p. 134
17 Uffe Østergård, op.cit. - p. 100
18 Tom Nairn, op.cit. - p. 154
19 ibid. - p. 117
20 ibid. - p. 94
21 ibid. - p. 96
22 ibid. - p. 98
23 Caroline Bingham: "Beyond the Highland Line", Constable and Company, 1991 - p. 126
24 ibid. - p. 125
25 Michael Lynch: "Scotland - A New History", Pimlico, 1992 - pp. 307-309
26 Michael Brander: "The Making of the Highlands", Constable and Company, 1980 - p. 85
27 Uffe Østergård: "Europas ansigter", Rosinante/Munksgaard, 1992 - p. 149
28 Bernhard Eric Jensen: "Det engelske imperium 1688-1850", Den Jydske Historiker, 1991 - p. 34
29 Tom Nairn: "The Break-up of Britain", New Left Books, 1977 - p. 138
30 Michael Brander, op.cit. - p. 86
31 Caroline Bingham, op.cit. - p. 127
32 ibid. - p. 139
33 Michael Lynch, op.cit. - pp. 334-339
34 Caroline Bingham, op.cit. - pp. 134-135
35 ibid. - p. 144
36 ibid. - p. 166
37 ibid. - p. 144
38 Tom Nairn, op.cit. - p. 166
39 ibid. - p. 166
40 Caroline Bingham, op.cit. - p. 145
41 Tom Nairn, op.cit. - p. 139
42 ibid. - p. 140
43 Caroline Bingham, op.cit. - p. 177
44 ibid. - p. 178
45 Tom Nairn, op.cit. - pp. 114-117
46 ibid. - pp. 144-145
47 William Donaldson: "The Jacobite Song - Political Myth and National Identity", Aberdeen University Press, 1988 - p. 92
48 Caroline Bingham, op.cit. - p. 183
49 Michael Brander: "The Making of the Highlands", Constable and Company, 1980 - p. 155
50 ibid. - p. 155
51 Michael Lynch, op.cit. - p. 355
52 ibid. - p. 343
53 William Donaldson, op.cit. - p. 94
54 Caroline Bingham, op.cit. - p. 181
55 Michael Brander, op.cit. - p. 153 / Caroline Bingham, op.cit. - p. 181 / Michael Lynch, op.cit. - p. 355
56 Robert Christian Thomsen: "Tartanry", Aalborg Universitet, 1995 - p. 24
57 Tom Nairn, op.cit. - p. 156
58 David McCrone - Stephen Kendrick - Pat Straw: "The Making of Scotland - Nation, Culture and Social Change", Edinburg University Press, 1989 - p. 5
59 Michael Lynch: "Scotland - A New History", Pimlico, 1992 - p. 392
60 ibid. - p. 392
61 ibid. - p. 386
62 ibid.
63 W. Hamish Fraser and R. J. Morris: "People and Society in Scotland - Volume II, 1830-1914", John Donald Publishers, 1990 - p. 267
64 ibid. - p. 359
65 Michael Lynch, op.cit. - p. 358
66 W. Hamish Fraser and R. J. Morris, op.cit. - p. 384
67 ibid. - pp. 406-410
68 ibid. - p. 266
69 ibid.
70 Michael Lynch, op.cit. - p. 397
71 W. Hamish Fraser and R. J. Morris, op.cit. - p. 294
72 Michael Lynch, op.cit. - p. 397
73 W. Hamish Fraser and R. J. Morris, op.cit. - p. 294
74 ibid. - p. 321
75 ibid.
76 Michael Lynch, op.cit. - p. 353
77 W. Hamish Fraser and R. J. Morris, op.cit. - p. 291
78 ibid. - p. 295
79 ibid.
80 ibid. - pp. 266-267
81 ibid. - p. 319
82 ibid. - p. 320 & Michael Lynch, op.cit - p. 398
83 Christopher Harvie: "No Gods and Precious Few Heroes", Edinburg University Press, 1993 - p. 1
84 ibid. - p. 1
85 ibid. - p. 11
86 ibid. - pp. 11-12
87 ibid. - p. 13
88 ibid.
89 ibid. - p. 24
90 ibid.
91 ibid. - p. 25
92 ibid. - p. 27
93 ibid.
94 R. H. Campbell: "The Economic Case for Nationalism" from Rosalind Mitchinson: "The Roots of Nationalism: Studies in Northern Europe", John Donald Publishers, 1980 - p. 143
95 ibid. - p. 146
96 Michael Lynch: "Scotland - A New History", Pimlico, 1992 - p. 428
97 ibid. - pp. 431-433
98 R. H. Campbell, op.cit. - p. 150
99 ibid. - p. 150
100 ibid. - p. 151
101 ibid.
102 ibid. - p. 152
103 ibid. - p. 154
104 Tom Nairn: "The Break Up of Britain", Low and Brydone Printers, 1977 - p. 154
105 ibid. - p. 140
106 ibid. - p. 158
107 ibid. - p. 156
108 Robert Christian Thomsen: "Tartanry", Aalborg Universitet, 1995 - p. 77
109 ibid. - p. 77
110 John Osmond: "The Divided Kingdom", Constable, 1988 - p. 93
111 Tom Gallagher: "The SNP and the Scottish Working Class" from "Nationalism in the Nineties", Edited by Tom Gallagher, Polygon, 1991 - p. 115
112 Michael Lynch: "Scotland - A New History", Pimlico, 1992 - pp. 441-443
113 J. D. Mackie: "Skotlands Historie", Vision, 1982 - pp. 335-336
114 "What is not happening in Scotland", Living Marxism, Issue 41, March 1992 (http://www.informinc.co.uk/LM/LM41/LM41_Scotland.html)
115 John Curtice: "Whatever happened to the Feelgood Factor?" (http://www.bbc.co.uk/election97/analysis/jcfeel.html)
116 Tom Gallagher, op.cit. - p. 102
117 BBC: "Scottish Election Results (1945 - 1992)" (http://www.bbc.co.uk/election97/background/pastelec/elecsco.htm)
118 Tom Gallagher, op.cit. - p. 105
119 Several sources (all SNP related) claim Scotland has as much as 70% of the European Union's energy reserves. One is former SNP MP George Reid: "Oh, To Be In Britain?", The Donaldson Lecture, September 1995 (http://www.rmplc.co.uk/eduweb/sites/hamish/donald95.htm) It has not been possible to verify this figure from non-SNP related sources.
120 Michael Lynch, op.cit. - p. 446
121 Martin Pugh: "State and Society - British Political and Social History 1870-1992", Arnold, 1994 - p. 293
122 Michael Lynch, op.cit. - p. 447
123 ibid. - p. 443
124 John Osmond, op.cit. - p. 71
125 According to George Reid - op.cit. - 40 to 50% of the electorate believes that a devolved parliament will ultimately lead to independence.
126 As mentioned previosly, it has not been possible to verify the figure from sources not related to the SNP.
127 John Osmond, op.cit. - pp. 83-84
128 ibid. - p. 93
129 Michael Lynch, op.cit. - p. 448
130 BBC: "Scottish Election Results (1945 - 1992)", op.cit.
131 "General Election Results 1997" (http://www.wp.com/Alba/results97.html)
132 Martin Pugh, op.cit. - p.293
133 Tom Gallagher, op.cit. - p. 114
134 A thorough examination of the influence of the invented traditions of Scottishness can be found in the following source: Robert Christian Thomsen: "Tartanry", Aalborg Universitet, 1995
135 "General Election Results 1997", op.cit.
136 BBC: "Fast Track Timetable For Devolution" (http://www.bbc.co.uk/election97/news/0515/timetable.htm)
137 Tom Gallagher, op.cit. - p. 124
138 "Vote SNP - Best For Scotland!" is one of the SNP slogans. (http://www.snp.org.uk/index2.htm)
139 John Osmond, op.cit. - p. 84
140 Tom Gallagher, op.cit. - p. 102
141 SNP: "SNP Policy - Europe" (http://www.snp.org.uk/library/p-europe.htm)
142 A term describing the apathethic failure to try to transform the society in which most Scots appear to have lost their faith. The term comes from "What is not happening in Scotland", op.cit.
143 John Osmond, op.cit.
144 ibid. - p. 76
145 Isobel Lindsay: "The SNP and the Lure of Europe" from "Nationalism in the Nineties", op.cit. - pp. 85-87
146 ibid. - pp. 86-88
147 SNP: "SNP Policy - Europe", op.cit.
148 The Donaldson Lecture is an annually held lecture on contemporary Scottish issues, given in honour of journalist and SNP Chairman Arthur Donaldson.
149 George Reid, op.cit.
150 John Osmond, op.cit. - p. 77
151 It has been argued by some that as society progresses, tradition and national identity becomes increasingly unimportant; this development has been termed "detraditionalization" or "post-traditional" and is discussed in "Detraditionalization", Edited by Paul Heelas, Scott Lash and Paul Morris, Blackwell, 1996
152 Tom Gallagher, op.cit. - p. 114
153 John Osmond, op.cit. - p. 74
154 The EU strives to allow a free, inter-national flow of labour and it is illegal to set up mechanisms protecting the interests of one's own nation.
155 Isobel Lindsay, op.cit. - p. 87
156 ibid. - p. 90
157 ibid. - p. 93
158 E.g. George Reid, op.cit.
159 Angela Morris, David McCrone and Richard Kiely: "The Heritage Consumers" from "Sharing the Earth", Edited by J. M. Fladmark, Donhead, 1995 - p. 73
160 "Europe's national identity crisis", Living Marxism, Issue 45, July 1992 (http://www.informinc.co.uk/LM/LM45/LM45_Europe.html)
161 Angela Morris, David McCrone and Richard Kiely, op.cit. - p. 73
162 George Reid, op.cit.
163 John Osmond, op.cit. - p. 75
164 "Europe's national identity crisis", op.cit.
165 ibid.
166 Isobel Lindsay, op.cit. - p. 99
167 Martin Pugh, op.cit. - p. 261